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ON SELF-DEFENSE, IMMINENCE, AND WOMEN
WHO KILL THEIR BATTERERS
RICHARD A. ROSEN*
The continuing reports ofjury nullifications in prosecutions
of battered women who kill their batterers, the exceptional
number of grants of executive clemency to women who are con-
victed, and, in North Carolina, the case of Judy Norman, have
provoked legal scholars to question the legal defenses available to
these women. In this Article, Professor Richard A. Rosen consid-
ers whether an imminence requirement is essential to the under-
lying concerns of the law of self-defense and examines the
consequences of modifying the requirement in the context of bat-
tered women cases. He analyzes the fundamental principles of
self-defense-proportionality, fault, and necessity-in conjunc-
tion with the actions of battered women who kill their batterers
in nonconfrontational settings. He postulates that the immi-
nence of impending harm requirement serves merely as a "trans-
lator" for necessity, ensuring that the defensive force is indeed
necessary. Therefore, when imminence conflicts with necessity,
necessity must prevail. Professor Rosen examines the historical
roots of the imminence requirement and concludes that it does
not have an unquestioned historical lineage as a fundamental
requirement for a finding of self defense.
He then describes the dilemma encountered by battered wo-
men in light of the dangers they face if, lacking a viable, non-
lethal alternative, they remain in the relationship. Professor Ro-
sen proposes modifying the imminence requirement to shift to the
jury the determination whether the defendant's use of deadly
force was necessary: The judge will instruct the jury that immi-
nence is a required element of self-defense unless the defendant
is able to present evidence that she reasonably believed the killing
was necessary even though the danger was not imminent. If the
defendant meets this burden of production, the jury will be in-
structed solely on necessity. Professor Rosen concludes that the
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proposed modification would retain the imminence requirement
in those cases in which it serves effectively as a translator of ne-
cessity, but lessen the law's reliance on it when this function is
not met.
I. INTRODUCTION
The first thing that turned my attention to the subject of battered
women, self-defense, and the imminence requirement was the case of
Judy Norman. Tortured and beaten by her husband for years,
threatened with death and mutilation if she attempted to escape or obtain
outside help, she finally killed her sleeping husband. Denied a self-de-
fense instruction, she was convicted of manslaughter and sentenced to six
years imprisonment.1
After reading the Norman decision, I was left with a firm belief that,
had she not killed her husband, he would have inevitably killed or seri-
ously harmed her, no matter what else she tried to do to change the
situation, or even if she had continued her passive submission. This con-
clusion was reinforced by the second event which prodded me into exam-
ining this area. I happened to pick up a slim volume of the Advance
Sheets of the North Carolina Supreme Court, a volume containing a
number of cases in which spurned husbands or boyfriends returned to
kill their former wives and lovers who had tried to leave them.' These
1. On appeal, the conviction was reversed by the North Carolina Court of Appeals, but
the North Carolina Supreme Court then reversed the court of appeals and reinstated the con-
viction. State v. Norman, 324 N.C. 253, 266, 378 S.E.2d 8, 16 (1989). The facts in Norman
are discussed more fully at infra notes 58-60 and accompanying text. The facts are also dis-
cussed extensively in B. Sharon Byrd, Till Death Do Us Part: A Comparative Law Approach to
JustifyingLethal Self-Defense by Battered Women, 1991 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 169, 169-
70; Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining the Issue of Separa-
tion, 90 MICH. L. REv. 1, 89-92 (1991); Kerry A. Shad, Note, State v. Norman: Self-Defense
Unavailable to Battered Women Who Kill Passive Abusers, 68 N.C. L. REV. 1159, 1161-62
(1990).
2. See Advance Sheets of Cases Argued and Determined in the Supreme Court of North
Carolina, Vol. 23, No. 25 (Sept. 4, 1990). Of the eight criminal cases reported in this volume,
six were homicides where men killed women. Three of these homicides were perpetrated by
ex-lovers or husbands of the victims. In State v. Simpson, 327 N.C. 178, 393 S.E,2d 771
(1990), the victim was killed by an ex-boyfriend whom she had refused to see after he stabbed
her during an argument. He tracked her down months later at the apartment of her new
boyfriend and blew her head off with a shotgun. Id. at 182, 393 S.E.2d at 774. In State v.
Lynch, 327 N.C. 210, 393 S.E.2d 811 (1990), the victim was attacked and stabbed to death by
her estranged husband in the parking lot where she worked. Id. at 213-15, 393 S.E.2d at 312-
14. In State v. Stevenson, 327 N.C. 259, 393 S.E.2d 527 (1990), the victim's possessive boy-
friend waited in her apartment for her to return from a date with someone else and shot her in
the back of the head as she ran away. Id. at 260-61, 393 S.E.2d 527-28. State v. Payne, 327
N.C. 194, 394 S.E.2d 158 (1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 927 (1991), also involved a man's
murder of his wife, but the killing in Payne was part of a plan to collect on his wife's insurance
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cases gruesomely demonstrated the fate that potentially awaited Ms.
Norman had she tried again to escape her tormentor. After reading
these cases the question emerged: if, in fact, Ms. Norman could reason-
ably have expected to meet this same fate, why could she not claim that
she acted in self-defense?
The reason for the trial court's refusal to permit Ms. Norman to
raise a defense of self-defense, no matter how many threats her husband
had made to maim and kill her, and no matter how many times he had
indicated his ability and willingness to carry out the most extreme acts of
brutality on her person, was that the danger of death or serious harm was
not imminent when she killed her husband.3 The North Carolina
Supreme Court agreed with the trial court's ruling. Following the tradi-
tional rule of self-defense in the state and this country,4 a majority of the
policy. Id. at 205-06, 394 S.E.2d at 164. See also State v. Taylor, 327 N.C. 147, 147-48, 393
S.E.2d 801, 803 (1990) (woman brutally murdered during an armed robbery); State v. Frank-
lin, 327 N.C. 162, 166-68, 393 S.E.2d 781, 784-85 (1990) (woman murdered for stealing co-
caine from defendant). In Lynch the court also cited several cases decided less than six months
earlier in which women were murdered by their ex-lovers or husbands. Lynch, 327 N.C. at
222-23, 393 S.E.2d at 818-19. See State v. Faucette, 326 N.C. 676, 678-82, 392 S.E.2d 71, 72-
74 (1990) (victim killed by ex-boyfriend); State v. Cummings, 326 N.C. 298, 304-05, 389
S.E.2d 66, 69-70 (1990) (victim killed by ex-lover who was father of her children).
3. Norman, 324 N.C. at 260, 378 S.E.2d at 12.
4. A requirement of imminence or immediacy of danger before defensive force can be
used is firmly established in North Carolina law. See State v. Holland, 193 N.C. 713, 718, 138
S.E. 8, 10 (1927) (requiring that the defendant reasonably believe he was "about to suffer"
death or great bodily harm). For instance, in State v. Mize, 316 N.C. 48, 340 S.E.2d 439
(1986), a case cited extensively in Norman, the court upheld the refusal of a self-defense in-
struction to a defendant found not to be in "imminent" danger because the defendant had to
wake the victim before the fatal assault, although the defendant had been pursued by the
victim the entire day. Id. at 53, 340 S.E.2d at 442. Similarly, most states require that the
defendant reasonably believe her adversary's violence to be "imminent," that is, "almost im-
mediately forthcoming." WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. ScoTr, JR., CRIMINAL LAW
§ 5.7(d) (2d ed. 1986). For a list of states permitting self-defense only in response to an "immi-
nent" threat, see 2 PAUL H. ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW DEFENSES § 131(b)(3) n.16 (1984).
Robinson also provides a list of the few states which do not require "imminent" danger before
allowing self-defense. Id. § 131(c)(2) n.27. He appears to be mistaken on several of those
listed, as his list includes California, Delaware, New Mexico, and Oklahoma, all of which have
required imminence in self-defense cases. See People v. Aris, 215 Cal. App. 3d 1178, 1186, 264
Cal. Rptr. 167, 172 (1989); State v. Stevenson, 38 Del. 105, 110, 188 A. 750, 752 (1936); State
v. Gallegos, 104 N.M. 247, 249, 719 P.2d 1268, 1270 (1986); Lary v. State, 50 Okla. Crim. 111,
118, 296 P. 512, 514 (1931).
The Model Penal Code requires the force used by the defendant to be "immediately neces-
sary for the purpose of protecting himself against the use of unlawful force... on the present
occasion." MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04(1) (1985). Most states, however, have not changed
their law to follow this approach. Id., cmt. 2(c), at 40. It is also unclear whether the MPC
formulation is really any change from the traditional definition of "imminent." Compare Sa-
rah B. Vandenbraak, Note, Limits on the Use of Defensive Force to Prevent Intramarital As-
saults, 10 RUT.-CAM. L.J. 643, 650-53 (1979) (finding little difference in the Model Penal Code
formulation from traditional imminence formulation) with Nancy Fiora-Gormally, Case/
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court held that because there was no imminent danger of serious physical
abuse or death when Ms. Norman killed her husband, the trial judge's
refusal to instruct the jury on self-defense was proper.5
Comment, Battered Wives Who Kill: Double Standard Out of Court, Single Standard In?, 2
LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 133, 159 (1978) (arguing that Model Penal Code formulation allows a
defense for battered women that traditional approach would preclude).
5. Norman, 324 N.C. at 260, 266, 378 S.E.2d at 12, 16. According to the majority,
because the imminence requirement is essential to ensure that necessity remain the basis of
self-defense, it therefore must be narrowly interpreted and strictly adhered to. Id. at 260-61,
264-65, 378 S.E.2d at 13, 15. The court associated "imminent" with immediate and unavoida-
ble danger and found no immediate threat to the defendant since Mr. Norman had been asleep
for some time when he was killed. Id. at 261-62, 378 S.E.2d at 13. In its earlier opinion
reversing the conviction, the court of appeals never directly mentioned the imminence require-
ment, but did assert that to require a battered woman to wait until she was being attacked to
act in self-defense would "ignore the realities of the condition." State v. Norman, 89 N.C.
App. 384, 393, 366 S.E.2d 586, 592, rev'd, 324 N.C. 253, 378 S.E.2d 8 (1989). The court of
appeals focused on the defendant's subjective belief in the necessity to kill to protect herself
from death or serious bodily harm and the objective reasonableness of this belief based on the
surrounding circumstances. Id. at 391-93, 366 S.E.2d at 590-91. The appellate court stressed
the past abuse of Ms. Norman, her well-grounded beliefs that her husband would kill her and
that escape was impossible, and the failure of her previous cries for help. Id. at 392-93, 366
S.E.2d at 591. The court held that since battered women are "immobilized by fear" during
attacks by their husbands, the defendant simply exercised her right of self-preservation when
she was able: during a "momentary hiatus in a continuous reign of terror." Id. at 393-94, 366
S.E.2d at 591-92. The majority of the North Carolina Supreme Court rejected this reasoning,
holding that
[t]he relaxed requirements for perfect self-defense proposed by [the] Court of Ap-
peals would tend to categorically legalize the opportune killing of abusive husbands
by their wives solely on the basis of the wives' testimony concerning their subjective
speculation as to the probability of future felonious assaults by their husbands.
Homicidal self-help would then become a lawful solution, and perhaps the easiest
and most effective solution, to this problem.
Norman, 324 N.C. at 265, 378 S.E.2d at 15.
In addition to relying on the lack of imminent danger, the majority also suggested that the
threat to Ms. Norman was not serious enough to justify her use of force since "her husband
had [n]ever inflicted any harm upon her that approached life-threatening injury." Id. It is
hard to take this contention seriously, since Mr. Norman, among his other actions, actually
threatened to kill his wife. State v. Norman, 89 N.C. App. 384, 387, 366 S.E.2d 586, 588,
rev'd, 324 N.C. 253, 378 S.E.2d 8 (1989). In any event, in North Carolina, as in other jurisdic-
tions, the right to use lethal force in self-defense can be triggered by threats of great bodily
harm as well as threats of death, and the amount of bodily harm Mr. Norman actually inflicted
on his wife, as well as that threatened, easily meets this standard under prevailing North Caro-
lina law. See, e.g., State v. Norris, 303 N.C. 526, 528-32, 279 S.E.2d 570, 571-74 (1981) (hold-
ing that constant threats and beatings are sufficient to allow the use of lethal force in self-
defense); State v. Spaulding, 298 N.C. 149, 155, 257 S.E.2d 391, 395 (1979) (allowing self-
defense based on previous attack and evidence that the victim had his hand "jammed" into his
pocket when the killing occurred); State v. Marsh, 293 N.C. 353, 353-55, 237 S.E.2d 745, 746-
47 (1977) (permitting self-defense where the defendant, who had been previously assaulted by
victim, fired twice at the victim who approached the defendant with "hate in his eyes").
Interestingly, Ms. Norman's manslaughter conviction, reinstated by the North Carolina
Supreme Court, seems itself to be unjustified under prevailing North Carolina law. North
Carolina defines voluntary manslaughter as unlawful killing of a human being without malice,
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On one level the view of the majority of the North Carolina
Supreme Court is unassailable-the threat of death or great bodily harm
was not imminent when Ms. Norman shot her husband, not, at least, by
any reasonable interpretation of the word imminent.' At the time she
killed her husband, Ms. Norman had at least several hours of peace and
safety before her, and even more if she chose to be absent when her hus-
band awoke. Thus, to the extent the court was simply applying the set-
tled law of North Carolina, its decision was surely correct. The attempt
by the dissent to wrestle the facts of this case into the confines of the
imminence requirement, while understandable and perhaps even lauda-
ble, was unpersuasive.7 Moreover, the decision by the North Carolina
Supreme Court was consistent with the law of self-defense as it has devel-
oped and as it is most commonly applied throughout the country today.
If harm is not looming at the moment defensive force is used, then force,
and especially deadly force, in self-defense is not allowed."
At a deeper level, however, the decision is disturbing. It is difficult
to imagine that Ms. Norman had any choice but to act as she did in order
to avoid a grave risk of death or serious harm at the hands of her hus-
band. By relying on the imminence requirement, the North Carolina
Supreme Court never answered the question whether it was necessary for
in the heat of passion as a result of legally sufficient provocation. State v. Upright, 72 N.C.
App. 94, 101, 323 S.E.2d 479, 484-85 (1984), disc, rev. denied, 313 N.C. 513, cert. denied, 313
N.C. 610, 329 S.E.2d 400, 332 S.E.2d 82 (1985). In addition, state case law firmly establishes
that where the defendant had time for a "cooling of the blood" there is no provocation as a
matter of law. State v. Highsmith, 74 N.C. App. 96, 100-01, 327 S.E.2d 628, 631, disc rev.
denied, 314 N.C. 119, 332 S.E.2d 486 (1985). In previous cases, a lapse of 15 minutes between
provocation and killing has been held to be a sufficient cooling time. State v. Williams, 141
N.C. 827, 827-28, 53 S.E. 823, 823 (1906); see also Highsmith, 74 N.C. App. at 97, 100-01, 327
S.E.2d at 629, 631 (holding that a 20 minute lapse was a sufficient cooling off period). In
Norman, of course, Ms. Norman had several hours to "cool off" before she killed her sleeping
husband.
6. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 750 (6th ed. 1990), defines "imminent" as "[s]omething
which is threatening to happen at once"; "something to happen upon the instant"; "something
... on the point of happening." Under the WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DIC-
TIONARY 1130 (1976) definition, "imminent" connotes something "ready to take place; near at
hand; impending." As these definitions indicate, and as courts have consistently found, see
supra note 4, imminence unquestionably includes a temporal requirement.
7. Justice Martin asserted that allowing self-defense in Norman would require no expan-
sion of the traditional self-defense requirements because these requirements, including immi-
nence, were met on the facts of the case. Norman, 324 N.C. at 266-67, 378 S.E.2d at 16-17
(Martin, J., dissenting). He argued that because battered women never experience any mo-
mentary sense of safety, future attacks are imminent at all times. Id. at 270-71, 378 S.E.2d at
18-19 (Martin, J., dissenting).. In his view, imminence "is not bounded merely by measurable
time, but by all of the facts and circumstances." Id. at 270, 378 S.E.2d at 18 (Martin, J.,
dissenting). The problem with this, of course, is that imminence does have, by definition, a
temporal component. See supra notes 4 and 6.
8. See supra note 4.
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Ms. Norman to kill her husband to avoid great bodily harm or death.
And is not this the proper question that should be addressed in Norman
and similar cases?
If it is true, as the evidence at trial tended to show, that either a call
to the police or an attempt to run away would have resulted in a risk of
death or further torture,9 then is it proper for society to brand Ms. Nor-
man, and others similarly situated, as criminals? If waiting for her hus-
band to attack her again would have put her at great risk, society should
not require her to wait before acting.
This Article addresses whether an unbending imminence require-
ment is essential to satisfy the concerns underlying the law of homicide
and self-defense. If it is indeed essential-if failing to require it in every
self-defense case would distort or undermine the core values of substan-
tive criminal law or if eliminating it would have a seriously negative im-
pact on the administration of the law-then justice must be found
elsewhere in a case like Norman. If, however, a rational and effective
self-defense doctrine can exist without total adherence to the requirement
of imminence, then a consideration of whether to modify this require-
ment is not only worthwhile, but essential.
There has been some limited discussion in the literature regarding
the role of imminence in self-defense. Paul Robinson has suggested elim-
inating the imminence requirement for self-defense as part of an overall
streamlining of the defense,10 and a few writers have discussed briefly the
pros and cons of such a proposal in the context of cases involving bat-
9. Ms. Norman's previous attempts to escape had all resulted in episodes of extreme
violence and/or death threats on the part of her husband. The evidence at trial was uncontra-
dicted that when Ms. Norman had tried to leave home in the past, her husband had found her,
forced her to return home, and had beaten her brutally. Norman, 324 N.C. at 257, 378 S.E.2d
at 10-11. During the episode leading up to the killing, he had threatened to kill her when he
got out of jail if she had him arrested. State v. Norman, 89 N.C. App. 384, 388, 366 S.E.2d
586, 589 (1988), rev'd, 324 N.C. 253, 378 S.E.2d 8 (1989). When Ms. Norman told her hus-
band that she was going to have him committed because of his drinking problem, he
threatened to cut her throat. Norman, 324 N.C. at 257, 378 S.E.2d at 11.
10. RoBINsoN, supra note 4, § 131(c)(1). Robinson rejects the traditional assumption
that only imminent harm requires a response, id., and asserts that if the necessity requirement
is applied appropriately, no abuse of the justification defense will occur, even if danger to the
victim is not imminent. Id. § 131(b)(3). He states:
If the concern of the limitation is to exclude threats of harm that are too remote to
require a response, the problem is adequately handled by requiring simply that the
response be "necessary." The proper inquiry is not the immediacy of the threat but
the immediacy of the response necessary in defense. If a threatened harm is such
that it cannot be avoided if the intended victim waits until the last moment, the





tered women.II No one, however, has fully examined the role of the im-
minence requirement in the law of self-defense nor discussed the possible
ramifications of eliminating or modifying the requirement, either for wo-
men who kill their batterers or for others claiming self-defense.
This Article, therefore, will examine the imminence requirement
and the consequences of modifying its use in self-defense cases. This is,
undoubtedly, not an easy question. This country's legal system has long
operated with a strong presumption against justifying or excusing a kill-
11. Some commentators advocate retaining the traditional imminence requirement, find-
ing that its elimination or expansion would encourage self-help, unnecessary killings, and con-
fusion in applying the self-defense privilege. For example, Cathryn Rosen states: "[T]he closer
the courts adhere to... immediacy, the greater the certainty that some harm was sure to occur
and that the defensive conduct constituted the least harmful alternative." Cathryn J. Rosen,
The Excuse of Self-Defense: Correcting a Historical Accident on Behalf of Battered Women
Who Kill, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 11, 31, 32 (1986). Others, like the dissenting justice in Norman,
would require a finding of imminence, but would eliminate or modify its temporal components.
See, eg., Loraine P. Eber, The Battered Wife's Dilemma: To Kill or To Be Killed, 32 HAS-
TINGS L.J. 895, 928-29 (1981) (arguing that a battered wife's constant fear that she will be
killed by her husband during a beating makes threat always "imminent"). One author advo-
cates keeping the imminence requirement, but would not require that this belief be reasonable
in cases in which women kill their batterers. Under this approach, so long as the defendant in
such a case believes that the harm is imminent, no matter how objectively unreasonable that
belief, self-defense is permitted. David L. Faigman, Note, The Battered Woman Syndrome and
Self-Defense: A Legal and Empirical Dissent, 72 VA. L. REv. 619, 643-47 (1986).
Other commentators focus on the need to allow testimony regarding Battered Women's
Syndrome to establish the reasonableness of women's perception of an imminent threat. See
Phyllis L. Crocker, The Meaning of Equality for Battered Women Who Kill Men in Self-De-
fense, 8 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 121, 128 (1985) (The task is to replace "the traditional doctrine
with a theory that considers the realities of women as fully as those of men."); Anita L. Grant,
Note, The Battered Woman: When a Woman's "Place" is in the Courts, 10 CRIM. JUST. J. 273,
286 (1988) ("It is crucial that the judge and jury understand that a woman may perceive
imminent and mortal danger in circumstances where a man would not which may then justify
her use of deadly force."); see also Elizabeth M. Schneider, Equal Rights to Trial for Women:
Sex Bias in the Law of Self-Defense, 15 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 623, 634-35,.644-47 (1980)
(arguing that the imminent danger rule "presupposes a one-time adversarial encounter," and
that women are disadvantaged unless evidence of past abuse and expert testimony of Battered
Woman's Syndrome is admitted in an individualized approach to each case).
Finally, agreeing with Robinson, Schulhofer strongly, albeit briefly, advocates the elimi-
nation of the imminence requirement:
[T]he traditional insistence on a literally "imminent" infliction of great bodily harm
must be abandoned outright. Imminence is relevant only because it helps identify
cases where flight or legal intervention will be impossible, so that violent self-help
becomes truly necessary. The decisive factor is necessity, not imminence per se.
Stephen J. Schulhofer, The Gender Question in Criminal Law, Soc. PHIL. & POL'Y, 105, 127
(Spring 1990). Schulhofer cites the Model Penal Code formulation of "immediately necessary
... on the present occasion," MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04(1) (1985), as an appropriate stan-
dard to replace the imminence requirement, but does not explain how the two temporal re-
quirements really differ. See Schulhofer, supra, at 127-28. See also Vandenbraak, supra note 4,
at 652-53 (finding little difference between MPC formulation and traditional imminence
requirement).
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
ing. Society is, and should be, reluctant to broaden a defense to the tak-
ing of life. Thus, in considering any expansion of the defense, one must
carefully consider the rationale underlying the present policy of forcing
Ms. Norman to wait until the next assault before responding in the only
way that would truly guarantee her safety.
In this analysis, certain questions must be answered. Can the courts
or legislatures modify the imminence requirement without moving too
far from society's goal of limiting self-defense only to those who act out
of the most dire necessity? Is the problem exemplified by Ms. Norman's
plight sufficiently widespread to require tinkering with the norms of sub-
stantive criminal law, or are less drastic solutions available? The begin-
ning point of this inquiry must be an understanding of the role the
imminence requirement plays in the law of self-defense.
II. IMMINENCE, NECESSITY, AND SELF-DEFENSE
A. Principles of Self-Defense
Three fundamental principles underlie the doctrine of self-defense:
proportionality, fault, and necessity. While different jurisdictions employ
different rules to govern the defense, in every jurisdiction the rules used
embody one of the three principles, or are a product of a balancing of
these principles. To the extent that the rules differ between jurisdictions,
they merely embody different judgments about the application of the
three principles in a specific situation."
Illustrative is the common formulation for self-defense to a homi-
cide charge, which requires that the actor not be the aggressor and that
she reasonably believe that fatal force is necessary to repel an imminent
attack which will result in death or great bodily harm. 13 Many jurisdic-
12. In fact, the three common principles underlie all of the defenses that permit an actor
to commit what would otherwise be unlawful activity in order to protect a valid interest. For
the most part, each of these interests is embodied in a different defense: self-defense, defense of
others, defense of property and/or habitation, necessity (choice of evils), duress, during war
and as part of law enforcement. See ROBINSON, supra note 4, § 13 1(a) (discussing the various
interests protected). With the exception of the last two categories, which have little reference
to the criminal law, each of the protective defenses constitutes a separate criminal law defense.
While each of these defenses operates under its own rules, every rule appearing in every one of
these defenses is based on one or more of the three fundamental principles: proportionality,
necessity, and lack of fault. See GEORGE P. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW § 10.5
(1978) (treating all categories of defense under the classification, "necessary defense[s]");
LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 4, §§ 5.4, 5.8-5.10 (discussing the requirements of a defense
based on necessity, defense of others, defense of property, and law enforcement); ROBINSON,
supra note 4 §§ 131-35 (applying these principles to all defensive force justifications).
13. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04 explanatory note at 32, cmt. 1 at 33-34 (1985);
LAFAVE, supra note 4, § 5.7; ROLLIN M. PERKINS & RONALD N. BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAW
1115 (3d ed. 1982); ROBINSON, supra note 4, §§ 131(a)-(d), at 132.
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tions also require that under some circumstances the actor must retreat if
it is possible to do so in safety.14 The fault principle underlies both the
refusal to give the defense to an aggressor 15 as well as its extension to
those who are reasonably mistaken as to the presence of any of the other
requirements.16 Requiring that lethal force only be used to repel like
force is related to the proportionality requirement.17 Both imminence
and, when used, retreat, are included to ensure that the defensive force is
truly necessary. 8
14. Most jurisdictions in this country do not require retreat, although there is a strong
minority requiring an actor to retreat if she can do so in complete safety. LAFAvE & SCOTT,
supra note 4, § 5.7(0, at 460-61. For further discussion of retreat in self-defense law, see Jo-
seph H. Beale, Jr., Retreat from a Murderous Assault, 16 HARV. L. REV. 567, 573-82 (1903)
(discussing the history of the retreat rule and arguing that retreat be required before deadly
force is used); Yolanda R. Mitchell, Criminal Law-No Longer a Duty to Retreat-Chapter
696 of Mass. Acts of 1981, 67 MASS. L. REv. 89, 89-90 (1982) (discussing Massachusetts'
decision not to require retreat when using force in dwelling); Philip E. Mischke, Note, Crimi-
nal Law-Homicide-Self-Defense-Duty to Retreat, 48 TENN. L. REV. 1000, 1001-19 (1981)
(tracing the development of the retreat rule in England and the United States, and discussing
Tennessee's adoption of the retreat requirement); Recent Development, State v. Charles: Ore-
gon Self-Defense Limited by Duty to Retreat, 19 WILLAMETrE L. REV. 166, 166-69 (1983)
(explaining the necessity rationale for Oregon's adoption of the retreat rule).
15. See, e.g., FLETCHER, supra note 12, § 10.5.2, at 858 (stating that aggressor's culpabil-
ity in starting the conflict results in the discounting of his interests); LAFAVE & SCOTr, supra
note 4, § 5.7, at 459-60 ("[O]ne who provokes the use of force against himself for the purpose
of causing serious bodily harm may not defend against the force he has provoked."). For a list
of jurisdictions denying self-defense to the initial aggressor, see ROBINSON, supra note 4, § 132
n.5.
16. An actor is allowed to make a reasonable mistake because "[tihe unpredictable and
confrontational nature of potentially justifying circumstances makes mistakes understandable,
especially for defensive force justifications, where the actor's decision is frequently made under
an impending threat of harm." ROBINSON, supra note 4, § 184(a), at 398; see also LAFAVE &
SCOTT, supra note 4, § 5.7(c), at 457 (stating that self-defense is allowed where defendant
reasonably believes in necessity of force, and quoting Justice Holmes: "'Detached reflection
cannot be demanded in the presence of an uplifted knife."' Brown v. United States, 256 U.S.
335, 343 (1921)).
17. See, eg., FLETCHER, supra note 12, § 10.5.4 (D), at 870 (explaining that in using
necessary force, only the minimal force required under the circumstances is permitted, and
that the force used must be in proportion to the interest defended); LAFAVE & ScOrr, supra
note 4, § 5.7(b), at 455 (stating that the law requires the amount of force used to be "reason-
ably related to the threatened harm which [defendant] seeks to avoid" ); ROBINSON, supra note
4, § 131(d), at 81 ("[The] force used by an actor must be reasonable in relation to the harm
threatened.").
18. See LAFAVE & Scorr, supra note 4, § 5.7(d), at 458-59 (explaining that the rationale
for the imminence requirement is that without imminence, alternatives to the use of force
would be available and force would not be necessary); ROBINSON, supra note 4, § 131(c)(1), at
78 ("[The imminence requirement] ... apparently reflects a determination that only imminent
harm necessitates a response."); see id. § 131(c)(4) (explaining that the retreat rule is based on
the rationale that if one may retreat in complete safety, defensive force is not necessary).
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
B. Imminence and Necessity
In self-defense, the concept of imminence has no significance in-
dependent of the notion of necessity. It is, in other words, a "translator"
of the underlying principle of necessity, not the principle itself. Society
does not require that the evil avoided be an imminent evil because it
believes that an imminent evil is the only type of evil that should be
avoided, nor because an imminent threatened harm is necessarily worse
than a non-imminent one. Rather, imminence is required because, and
only because, of the fear that without imminence there is no assurance
that the defensive action is necessary to avoid the harm. 9 If the harm is
not imminent then surely the actor can take steps that will alleviate the
necessity for responding with fatal force.
At the trial level imminence operates as a condition precedent for a
finding of necessity. The legislature, or in common-law jurisdictions, the
appellate courts, have made an a priori decision that a killing to prevent a
non-imminent threatened harm cannot in any case be a necessary killing,
and the jury (or judge in a bench trial) must decide guilt or innocence in
light of this determination.20
Because imminence serves only to further the necessity principle, if
there is a conflict between imminence and necessity, necessity must pre-
vail. If action is really necessary to avert a threatened harm, society
should allow the action, or at least not punish it, even if the harm is not
imminent. Conversely, even if the harm is imminent, society should not
permit defensive action if such action is not necessary.
While the criminal law in this country tends to follow the latter
proposition, at least to some degree,21 it ignores the former. Thus, gener-
ally the law requires that a person avoid using force, especially lethal
force, if an alternative to avoiding a threat is available, even if the threat
poses an imminent danger.2 2 The law does not, however, allow a person
19. See supra notes 11 and 18; see also ROBINSON, supra note 4, § 13 1(b), at 76 ("[A]s a
practical matter actions taken in the absence of an imminent threat may not be necessary.");
id. at n.18 and accompanying text.
20. As Fletcher notes, the imminence requirement acts as a limitation on the ability of
citizens to override legislative decisions regarding the balance of interests in society.
FLETCHER, supra note 12, § 10.2.4, at 795.
21. The obvious exception, of course, arises in situations when the law does not require an
actor to retreat before using force, even if the actor could retreat in complete safety. For a
discussion of the history of the retreat rule, see infra notes 49-55 and accompanying text.
22. For instance, in some self-defense situations an actor must comply with a demand by
an aggressor before deadly force may be used against the aggressor, so long as the compliance
can be done safely. ROBINSON, supra note 4, § 131(d)(4), at 87. In certain jurisdictions, one
must surrender property to another making a claim of right to the property in order to avoid
using force, since injury could be avoided by giving up the property. Id. § 131(e)(4), at 92.
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to use force of any degree to ward off a danger that is not deemed immi-
nent, no matter how necessary the protective action may be.
On a theoretical level, this choice seems questionable. In cases
where the principle, i.e., necessity, is present, and the translator, i.e., im-
minence, is not, this choice mandates ignoring the principle because of
the absence of the translator. If imminence is required only to ensure
necessity, how can the law discount necessity even when it presents itself
without imminence? This course permits imminence to act as an inhibi-
tor, interfering with the underlying norm instead of furthering it.
One can argue, of course, that lethal force can never be necessary
unless the threatened harm is imminent, but it is not difficult to imagine
situations in which this is not the case. For example, Robinson postu-
lates the situation of a hostage who is told that he will be executed at
some date in the future; in the interim he is kept in captivity in perfect
safety. Although the threatened harm is not imminent, it is reasonably
certain to happen. The hostage discovers an opportunity to escape, but
can do so safely only by killing the captor.23 Should the law brand the
hostage a criminal if he kills his captor in order to escape? Robinson
argues that it should not, and his position seems unassailable.24 In this
situation the captor is at fault, the killing is proportional to the harm
threatened, and the killing is necessary to protect an innocent person's
life. The escaped hostage easily could be considered a hero rather than a
criminal. Clearly, then, a killing can be necessary even though the harm
threatened is not imminent.
When a thief attempts to steal property, however, force may be used in protection of the
property. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04 cmt. (4)(d), at 59 (1985). The Model Penal Code
states:
[N]or is [the use of deadly force] justifiable if:... (ii) the actor knows that he can
avoid the necessity of using such force with complete safety by retreating or by sur-
rendering possession of a thing to a person asserting a claim of right thereto or by
complying with a demand that he abstain from any action that he has no duty to take
Id. § 3.04(2)(b)(ii).
23. ROBINSON, supra note 4, § 131(c)(1), at 78. The captor promises to kill the hostage
one week later. The hostage's only opportunity to escape occurs each day when his captor
brings him food. Id.
24. Robinson acknowledges that the danger in his hypothetical is not "imminent" in the
traditional sense, but argues that since a self-protective response is clearly necessary, the hos-
tage should not be required to wait until his captor is standing over him with a knife before
using deadly force. Id. In one edition of their casebook, Professors Kadish and Paulsen pres-
ent a similar hypothetical: A man is held captive by his lover's husband, who threatens to kill
him eventually. They ask the students whether the man can kill his captor any time during the
imprisonment or if he must wait until he is about to be killed. SANFORD H. KADISH &
MONRAD G. PAULSEN, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PRocEssEs 498-99 (3d ed. 1975).
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C. The Historical Perspective
Considering the present pervasiveness of the imminence require-
ment, it is surprising that its historical pedigree is not completely clear.
Modem self-defense has two historical roots in the early common law:
First, the excuse of se defendendo and second, the justification of felony
prevention. 5 Initially, imminence of impending harm was not a specific
requirement in either situation. 6
It would be misleading, however, to place too much emphasis on the
absence of specific imminence requirements in these early defenses, for
neither defense was drawn to apply to what is now considered a generic
self-defense situation-where a faultless defender uses fatal force to repel
a murderous assault. Se defendendo, for instance, was limited in applica-
tion to a specific category of cases-those in which the deaths resulted
from a sudden brawl, or "chance medley."' 27 In the se defendendo para-
digm, two men would meet, neither with any intention of harming the
other. An argument would start, leading to the use of force, and one
combatant would kill the other. If the defendant killed during this sud-
den quarrel without acting in self-defense, he was guilty of manslaughter,
not murder.28 If, however, the slayer could show that he killed only be-
cause his life was threatened by the other, and he could not retreat or
otherwise avoid the use of lethal force, he was allowed the plea of se
25. FLETCHER, supra note 12, § 10.5.4(A), at 866. As will be explained below, when used
as an excuse, se defendendo required forfeiture and a royal pardon, while felony prevention,
when used as a justification, allowed a full acquittal. See infra notes 30 and 35.
26. These doctrines were based instead on a strict necessity requirement. See infra notes
31-34 and accompanying text.
27. PERKINS & BOYCE, supra note 13, at 1124 ("[I]t seems also to be confirmed by the
general tenor of our law-books, which speaking of homicide se defendendo, suppose it to be
done in some quarrel or affray." (quoting William Hawkins, I HAWK. P.C. c. 28, § 24 (6th ed.
by Leach 1788))); see also GARY A. LEWIS, DAFFY DUCK AND PORKY PIG IN DUCKS OF
YORE 15-22 (1990) (telling story of two protagonists who meet and duel on a bridge in typical
chance medley scenario); PERKINS & BOYCE, supra note 13, at 1121 (defining chance medley
as an ordinary fist-fight or nondeadly encounter); Thomas A. Green, The Jury and the English
Law of Homicide, 1200-1600, 74 MICH. L. REV. 413, 482 (1976) (applying se defendendo to
homicides that "stemmed from a sudden or chance falling out" and not from malice
aforethought).
28. See 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *184-85 (classifying a homicide as
manslaughter if both parties are mutually engaged in combat at the time of the killing, but as
murder if two parties plan beforehand to fight (as in a duel), or if one party pursues the other
after the affray has ended); MATTHEW HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 41-42 (photo. reprint
1972) (1678) (stating that if B assaults A in a chance-medley situation, and A mortally wounds
B before retreating "to the Wall," A is guilty of manslaughter); see also WILLIAM HAWKINS,
A TREATISE OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 75 (photo. reprint 1972) (1724-26) ("That if a
Man strike another upon Malice Prepense, and then fly to the Wall, and there kill him in his
own Defence, he is guilty of Murder.").
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defendendo.2 9
Even if the jury found that the defendant acted se defendendo, how-
ever, it could not acquit the defendant. A verdict of se defendendo would
excuse, but not justify, the killing. The defendant was committed to
"gaol," his property subjected to forfeit, and his life spared only upon
the King's pardon or excuse.30
The medieval se defendendo rules required that the defendant kill
only out of the most dire necessity to save his own life, and retreat was
required if at all possible. 31 Although in the early cases there was no
mention of an imminence requirement, this omission can likely be ex-
plained by the fact that requiring imminence would have been redundant
for a defense allowed only in a chance medley situation. Once the chance
medley was ended and the danger no longer threatened, se defendendo
was no longer available.32
Although the common-law se defendendo rules were quite strict, the
early rules permitting a defense based on felony prevention were far more
lenient. Not only was there no requirement of imminent danger to life
and limb, but the killing need not even have been committed to save a
life. The defendant need show only that it was necessary to kill to pre-
29. "[B]ut if the slayer hath not begun to fight, or (having begun) endeavours to decline
any farther struggle, and afterwards, being closely pressed by his antagonist, kills him to avoid
his own destruction, this is homicide excusable by self-defence." BLACKSTONE, supra note 28,
at * 184; HALE, supra note 28, at 41-42 ("If A. be assaulted by B. and before a mortal wound
given A. gives back till he come to the Wall, and then in his defence kills B. this is Se
defendendo."); HAWKINS, supra note 28, at 75 (asserting that if a man gives no mortal wound
until he retreats as far as possible, he is guilty of se defendendo only).
30. Forfeiture was originally required only of suspects who fled and refused to surrender.
Green, supra note 27, at 425; see also NAOMI D. HURNARD, THE KING'S PARDON FOR HOMI-
CIDE 147 (1969) ("[Florfeiture of chattels was also the regular penalty for fleeing from justice
.... Flight by anyone suspected of a crime or who thought he might be suspected was, then,
an offence and this was the punishment for it."). Gradually forfeiture became an additional
penalty in all cases of excusable homicide regardless of flight by the accused. Id.; 3 W. S.
HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 257 (1909); Green, supra note 27, at 425. The
forfeiture and pardon requirements replaced the previous system of compensation to the vic-
tim's kin with a system of punishment by the Crown and compensation to the Crown. See
generally HURNARD, supra, at 1-8 (discussing the earlier methods of dealing with homicides).
31. HURNARD, supra note 30, at 92 (asserting that at least by the end of the 16th century,
in chance medley situations, juries were required to state that the killing had not been with
malice aforethought and that the killer could not otherwise have escaped with his life); Beale,
supra note 14, at 569 ("And if the killing were unnecessary not only could there be no acquit-
tal, but there would not even be a pardon."); Green, supra note 27, at 420 ("By the early
thirteenth century, [self-defense] had come to be defined as slaying out of literally vital neces-
sity: the slayer, under mortal attack, had acted as a last resort to save his own life.").
32. See BLACKSTONE, supra note 28, at *185 ("[S]o is also the time to be considered: for
if the person assaulted does not fall upon the aggressor till the affray is over, or when he is
running away, this is revenge and not defence.").
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vent the felony or to effectuate an arrest or a capture of the felon.3 3 The
slayer did not have to retreat. In fact, at one time a person was allowed
to pursue and kill the felon if he could not safely apprehend him.34 Ad-
ditionally, the defendant who proved this defense was considered to have
acted in a justified, not an excused, manner, and thus was entitled to a
full acquittal with no forfeiture or other penalty.35
The purpose for the difference in treatment between the two de-
fenses is somewhat unclear. One widely cited reason for the variations is
the presumption that both parties to a chance medley were somewhat at
fault, and thus the law should not acquit, and therefore condone, a kill-
ing by one who shares blame for the death.36 In the felony prevention
33. From as early as the seventh century, killing a robber "caught in the act" who resisted
arrest was justifiable if he could not be taken otherwise. Green, supra note 27, at 436-37 n,87.
During the 14th century, courts began to acquit those who killed to prevent attempted rob-
bery, breaking into a house at night, or arson of a house. Id. at 440 (" 'And in many other
cases a man may kill another without impeachment, as if thieves come to rob a man, or to
burgle his house, he may safely kill them if he cannot take them.' ") (quoting JUSTIcE
THORPE, 22 LE LIVRE DES AssIsEs ET PLEAS DEL'CORONE EN TEMPS DU Roy EDWARD LE
TIERS 55 (1349))); see also HALE, supra note 28, at 36-38 (describing killing in pursuit of a
felon as justifiable homicide); HAWKINS, supra note 28, at 70 (stating that if felon or accused
felon cannot be apprehended alive, a private citizen or official may kill him); Beale, supra note
14, at 572-73 ("Killing for which justification was allowed must be necessary; that is, it was
permitted only when to refrain from killing the malefactor would necessarily leave him free to
commit his crime and escape.").
34. HALE, supra note 28, at 36 (stating that one may pursue and kill a fleeing felon upon
"Hue-and-Cry"). Beale notes that a man who chased an escaping felon and decapitated him as
he ran was acquitted. Beale, supra note 14, at 568. The breadth of the felony prevention
defense obviously stemmed from the notion that the apprehension of a felon was an act neces-
sary for advancement of justice. See Green, supra note 27, at 437-39. Holdsworth noted that
it was the duty of every citizen to help arrest a felon, with criminal proceedings as the penalty
for failing to perform those duties. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 30, at 312; see also Pond v.
People, 8 Mich. 149, 176 (1860) (holding that it is the "duty of every man who sees a felony to
prevent it"); Beale, supra note 14, at 569 (stating that it was a dereliction of duty to retreat). It
is also worth noting that at early common law any felon faced death as an ultimate punish-
ment, see Green, supra note 27, at 418, so allowing or encouraging a citizen to kill a fleeing
felon may not seem as harsh as it would today. Cf. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 11 (1985)
(finding unconstitutional the use of deadly force to apprehend a felon in the absence of evi-
dence that felon was armed or dangerous).
35. "In these instances of justifiable homicide, you will observe that the slayer is in no
kind of fault whatsoever, not even in the minutest degree; and is therefore to be totally acquit-
ted and discharged, with commendation rather than blame." BLACKSTONE, supra note 28, at
* 182; see, eg., HALE, supra note 28, at 38; HAWKINS, supra note 28, at 70; Green, supra note
27, at 436.
36. [B]ut it seems also to be confirmed by the general Tenor of our Law-Books ....
That where the Law judges a Man guilty of Homicide se defendendo, there must be
some precedent Quarrel, in which both Parties always are... in some Fault, so that
the Necessity, to which a Man is at length reduced to kill another, is in some Mea-
sure presumed to have been owing to himself: For it cannot be imagined That the
Law which is founded on the highest Reason, will adjudge a Man to forfeit all his
Goods, and [require a pardon] without some appearance of a Fault.
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scenario, by contrast, only one party was at fault, and this was the person
slain.37
Although initially limited to killings of robbers, the right to kill a
"manifest felon" was extended eventually to the killing of perpetrators of
most forcible felonies.3 8 Until at least 1532, and perhaps later, however,
one glaring exception existed to this otherwise expansive doctrine-one
could not justifiably kill another to prevent a murder.3 9 Although the
HAWKINS, supra note 28, at 72. See FRANCIS BACON, THE ELEMENTS OF THE COMMON
LAWES OF ENGLAND 33 (photo. reprint 1978) (1630) ("[Q]uarrels are not presumed to grow
without some wrongs either in words or deedes on either part .... "); PERKINS & BOYCE,
supra note 13, at 1121 ("One who was the aggressor in a chance-medley... or who culpably
entered into such an engagement ... not being entirely free from fault, must not resort to
deadly force if there is any other reasonable method of saving himself.").
37. See supra note 35; BACON, supra note 36, at 33-34 (noting that where the aggressor is
completely at fault, such as in robbery, assault, or rape, the victim kills without malice and,
therefore, is justified); PERKINS & BOYCE, supra note 13, at 1121 ("One, entirely free from
fault, is the victim of an assault which was murderous from the beginning.").
38. For the development of the law in this area, see supra note 33. See also Beale, supra
note 14, at 569 (noting that the jury could acquit a defendant who killed a "felon[ ] in the act
of a felony... who would not surrender peaceably"); Green, supra note 27, at 440-42 (noting
the extension of the doctrine "to include slaying to prevent a felony").
39. 24 Hen. 8, ch. 5 (1532) (Eng.), illustrates the conflusion:
Forasmuch as it hath been in question and ambiguity, that if any evil disposed person
or persons do attempt feloniously to rob or murder any person or persons in or nigh
any common highway ... or in their mansion.., should happen in his or their being
in their such felonious intent, to be slain by him or them, whom the said evil-doers
should so attempt to rob or murder;... the said person.., should for the death of
the said evil disposed person forfeit or lose his goods and chattels for the same, as any
other person should do that by chance-medley should happen to kill or slay any
other person in his or their defence; ... be it enacted... that if'any person ... be
indicted or appealed of or for the death of any such evil disposed person... [he] shall
not forfeit or lose any lands, tenements, goods, or chattels.., but shall be thereof and
for the same fully acquitted and discharged ....
Id. There has been considerable conflict regarding interpretation of this statute. Beale, refer-
ring to Lord Coke, maintains that the statute was intended to cover only the slaying of thieves:
"If a thief offer to rob or murder B either abroad or in his own house, and thereupon
assault him, and B defend himself without any giving back, and in his defence killeth
the thief, this is no felony; for a man shall never give way to a thief, &c., neither shall
he forfeit anything .... "
Beale, supra note 14, at 572 (quoting Coke). Though he agrees that "[tihere seems no sufficient
reason for distinguishing between killing a robber and killing a felon who is attempting murder
or rape," Beale interprets the language of Coke as justifying a killing only where a thief de-
mands, "Your money or your life," and the victim kills to prevent the robbery. Id.; see also
HALE, supra note 28, at 39-40 (noting that killing to resist arson, rape, or robbery is justified,
but not addressing murder).
Other authors disagree with this interpretation, and find instead that this statute did allow
a victim to kill to protect himself from murder with "malice prepensed." PERKINS & BOYCE,
supra note 13, at 1122 (analyzing the language of the statute and rejecting Beale's interpreta-
tion); Green, supra note 27, at 480 (asserting that the statute generally provided a defense
against professional or planned killings). The writings of several 18th century authors support
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rapist, robber, and burglar could all be slain even if they did not present
an immediate danger to the slayer,' one who killed to prevent a slaying
was in theory relegated to claiming se defendendo, with its strict rules,
penalties, and requirement for a pardon, as well as its presumption that
the killing took place during a brawl."
Over time the distinctions between the two defenses began to blur:
The requirements for forfeiture and a pardon in se defendendo cases be-
gan to be applied automatically and then gradually disappeared,4" and
this interpretation as well. See, e.g., BLACKSTONE, supra note 28, at *181 ("For the one uni-
form principle that runs through our own, and all other laws, seems to be this: that where a
crime, in itself capital, is endeavoured to be committed by force, it is lawful to repel that force
by the death of the party attempting."); MICHAEL FoSTER, A REPORT OF SOME PROCEED-
INGS ON THE COMMISSION FOR THE TRIAL OF THE REBELS IN THE YEAR 1746, IN THE CITY
OF SURRY; AND OTHER CROWN CASES, TO WHICH ARE ADDED DISCOURSES UPON A FEW
BRANCHES OF CROWN LAW 273 (London, E. & R. Brooke, 3d ed. 1792). Hawkins states:
I can see no Reason why a Person, who without Provocation is assaulted by another
... in such a Manner as plainly shews an Intent to murder him,... may not justify
killing such an Assailant, as much if he had attempted to rob him: For is not he, who
attempts to murder me, more injurious than he who barely attempts to rob me?
HAWKINS, supra note 28, at 72. Both sides to this controversy agree that a killing in self-
defense during a chance-medley (se defendendo) was not covered by the statute and thus was
not justifiable homicide. See BLACKSTONE, supra note 28, at *183-84; HALE, supra note 28, at
41; HAWKINS, supra note 28, at 72; Green, supra note 27, at 482.
The confusion surrounding this issue was effectively ended by an 1828 statute dispensing
with the pardon requirement and declaring that both the se defendendo and crime prevention
defenses, if proved, merited an acquittal. See 9 Geo. 4, ch. 31, § 10 (1828) (Eng.); 3 HENRY J.
STEPHEN, NEW COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 108 (photo. reprint 1979)
(1841-45) ("[A]ll practical distinction between justifiable and excusable homicide is now at
length wholly done away.").
40. See supra note 33. There is actually some question whether a woman could kill to
prevent a rape, and Beale suggests that she could not. Beale, supra note 14, at 568. The
majority of writers, however, reject this contention. See, e.g., BACON, supra note 36, at 33-34
("[I]f a woman kill him that assaileth her to ravish her it is justifiable without anie pardon,");
BLACKSTONE, supra note 28, at *181 ("The English law likewise justifies a woman, killing one
who attempts to ravish her."); HALE, supra note 28, at 39 (finding no felony when a woman
kills one attempting to "ravish" her); HAWKINS, supra note 28, § 21, at 71 ("And the killing of
a Wrong-doer... may be justified in many cases as where.., a Woman kills one who attempts
to ravish her.").
41. See Green, supra note 27, at 442. For a discussion of these penalties, see supra note 30
and accompanying text.
42. Pardons in cases of excusable homicide were a matter for the King's discretion until
the end of the 13th century, when they became a matter of course. Green, supra note 27, at
426. By the reign of Edward III, the Chancellor began to issue pardons in place of the King.
PERKINS & BOYCE, supra note 13, at 1123-24 ("As years went by the king issued pardons in
these cases with such regularity that eventually they were issued by the Chancellor as a matter
of course, without bothering the king with this detail."); Beale, supra note 14, at 570. The
need for pardon was officially eliminated in England by 9 Geo. 4, ch. 31, § 10 (1828) (Eng.).
The forfeiture requirement likewise had eroded by the 18th century. See BLACKSTONE, supra
note 28, at *188 (noting that as early as our records will reach, a writ of restitution of goods
came as a matter of course; and stating that since personal property had become more consid-
SELF-DEFENSE
juries were permitted to acquit defendants who used fatal force to re-
spond to a murderous assault.4 3 By the nineteenth century, in most juris-
dictions, the two defenses were combined into one-the defense of self-
defense.' From its crime-prevention roots, the modem defense became
broadly applicable to situations beyond chance medley as a justification
defense entitling the defendant to a full acquittal. From se defendendo,
the defense took the strict requirements for necessity, including the
newly acquired requirement of imminence of impending harm.4"
The early history of the law of self-defense is relevant to this Arti-
cle's thesis in several respects. First, it is apparent that the imminence
requirement does not have an unquestioned historical lineage as a funda-
mental requirement for a finding of self-defense. In one of the two early
roots of self-defense it was at most an implicit requirement; for the other,
it explicitly was not required. What was required in all circumstances
was that the killing be necessary for the accomplishment of the societal
goals underlying the defense: in one situation, the preservation of life; in
the other, the prevention of a felony or capture of a felon. Further, the
imminence requirement was implied only in the situation where the law
presumed that both parties to the homicidal act were somewhat at
fault-the sudden brawl or chance medley.
Also relevant to the present inquiry is the proposition, for which
some support exists, that mistrust of jurors by the Crown retarded the
development of the law of self-defense. Early jurors, reluctant to impose
the death penalty on neighbors and friends, apparently were all too will-
ing to fabricate evidence and stretch the facts of cases to fit them within
the boundaries of se defendendo and misadventure, i.e., accident, a prac-
tice that led to pardons, or even acquittal, of defendants in cases that did
erable, forfeiture was too severe, and in cases of self-defense, judges usually permitted, if not
directed, acquittal). The distinction in punishment between justifiable and excusable homicide
apparently never existed in the United States. FRANCIS WHARTON, LAW OF HOMICIDE 37
(Ist ed. 1855); see Pond v. People, 8 Mich. 149, 175 (1860).
43. See supra note 39.
44. See WHARTON, supra note 42, at 211 ("As... the distinction between [chance med-
ley] and justifiable homicide in this country no longer exists-in each case... acquittal [is] to
be entered-the two branches will be considered together.").
45. An articulated imminence requirement began to appear in the late 18th century. See
BLACKSTONE, supra note 28, at *184 (noting that right to act in self-defense exists only "in
sudden and violent cases; when certain and immediate suffering would be the consequence of
waiting for the assistance of the law") (emphasis added); see also WILLIAM 0. RUSSELL, A
TREATISE ON CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS 668 (3d ed. 1845) (requiring imminence to estab-
lish the certainty of the felon's intent to "murder, ravish, or commit other felonies attended
with force or surprise"); WHARTON, supra note 42, at 211-13 (articulating requirement of
imminence).
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not warrant acquittal under the formal rules.4 6 Although the inequities
in the laws governing defensive homicides were apparent, the Crown was
unwilling to change the laws for fear of giving jurors even more leeway to
free those charged with murder.47 Similarly, whether one is willing to
lessen the law's present adherence to the imminence doctrine depends in
large measure on the trust one has in jurors to follow faithfully their
instructions.48
D. The Retreat Doctrine
Before concluding this discussion of necessity and imminence, it is
worthwhile to examine briefly the requirement that a person must retreat
from the conflict before using lethal force if it is possible to do so in
safety. Like the imminence requirement, the retreat rule is used to guar-
antee that lethal force is used only when it is truly necessary.49
Since the duty to retreat before using lethal force was an early com-
ponent of the se defendendo defense, it actually has a more ancient line-
age than the imminence requirement, although, like imminence, retreat
46. Juries consistently refused to cooperate with the King's system of capital punishment
for all homicides, thinking it unjust to punish unpremeditated murder and manslaughter to the
same degree as murder "by stealth." This resistance to the harshness of the King's law led to
both acquittals and findings of se defendendo in unsuitable cases. Green, supra note 27, at 416-
17, 430-32. In the medieval period, juries convicted only about 20% of all homicide defend-
ants. Approximately 60-90% were acquitted and 10-40% received verdicts in se defendendo.
Id. at 432. The jurors tended to shape their verdicts according to the law of the time. For
instance, from the late 14th century until the 16th century, the pardon requirement for acci-
dental homicide disappeared and instead these defendants were acquitted. Id. at 444-45. Dur-
ing this time, juries often held that the defendants were mere "'accidental' slayers on whose
weapons murderous assailants had, through their own fault, flung their bodies." Id. at 449.
The severity of the law and the jurors' perceived need for resistance were compounded by
the fact that shock and infection often aggravated less serious injuries, producing death and
resulting in homicide prosecutions based on minor brawls and minimal injuries. Id. at 415.
Juries also were reluctant to comply with the King's law because no compensation was af-
forded to the kin of the victim. HURNARD, supra note 30, at 23.
47. See, eg., HURNARD, supra note 30, at 23 (noting desire of Crown to restrict power of
jurors to acquit or excuse because of distrust of jurors); Green, supra note 27, at 433-36 (stat-
ing that since the development of the common law depended mainly on the introduction of
issues that the law had not previously addressed, the jury's tendency to pigeonhole cases into
the few available categories obscured the need for change). Hurnard also suggests that the
embellishment of the facts by juries to fit cases into the category of self-defense caused
problems in the law of homicide to be overlooked. HURNARD, supra note 30, at 23-27.
48. See infra text accompanying notes 88-90.
49. ROBINSON, supra note 4, § 131(c)(4), at 81 (stating that retreat rule was "designed to
prevent use of unnecessary force"); see id. § 131(d), at 85 (noting that states that adopt the
retreat rule do so in order to protect society's interest in discouraging the escalation of vio-
lence). Proponents of the retreat rule assert that if an escape route is available, deadly force is
not necessary to defend oneself. See LAFAVE & Scoarr, supra note 4, § 5.7(0, at 460.
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was not required if one killed to prevent a felony."0 Despite this history,
retreat is not uniformly required in this country, and even in those juris-
dictions that do require retreat, the rules governing the doctrine are rid-
died with exceptions.51
50. If jurors found that the slayer in a chance medley encounter could have "turned tail
and outrun his assailant" instead of retaliating with force, the defendant was convicted of
manslaughter. Green, supra note 27, at 428-29; see also Beale, supra note 14, at 569 (retreat
required in chance medley); Mischke, supra note 14, at 1003-04 (if escape possible, no neces-
sity); cf Beale, supra note 14, at 574 (dereliction of duty to retreat or even to fail to pursue a
felon); Green, supra note 27, at 436 n.85 (stating that one may pursue and justifiably slay
"'hand-having' thieves, notorious malefactors, and slayers attempting to escape from the 'hue
and cry' raised against them").
51. The English law of self-defense was accepted immediately in the colonies, but the issue
of retreat was much disputed. Beale, supra note 14, at 576; Mischke, supra note 14, at 1005.
Compare Erwin v. State, 29 Ohio St. 186, 199-200, 23 Am. Rep. 733, 740 (1876) (holding that
"a true man, who is without fault, is not obliged to fly from an assailant, who, by violence or
surprise, maliciously seeks to take his life or do him enormous bodily harm") and Runyan v.
State, 57 Ind. 80, 84, 26 Am. Rep. 52, 55 (1877) (rejecting the retreat requirement) with Com-
monwealth v. Drum, 58 Pa. 9, 22 (1868) (holding that an aggressor's right to live outweighed
the victim's right not to retreat). The South and the West rejected the retreat rule, finding it
cowardly and dangerous. Beale, supra note 14, at 577; Mischke, supra note 14, at 1006-07.
The United States Supreme Court's early pronouncements on the necessity of retreat reflected
the American ambivalence. Mischke, supra note 14, at 1007-08. Compare Beard v. United
States, 158 U.S. 550, 564 (1895) (holding that defendant had no duty to retreat since he was
"where he had a right to be") with Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492, 498 (1896) (limiting
Beard to the fact that Beard was on his own premises, and finding a duty to retreat in all other
cases) and Brown v. United States, 256 U.S. 335, 344 (1921) (considering the failure to retreat
as a factor in determining whether the defendant exceeded the bounds of reasonable self-de-
fense).
The majority of jurisdictions today do not require retreat, but allow deadly force to be
used by the defendant if he reasonably believes the aggressor will kill or seriously injure him.
LAFAVE & ScoTT, supra note 4, § 5.7(0, at 460; see, e.g., Johnson v. State, 253 Ga. 37, 39, 315
S.E.2d 871, 873 (1984) (reversing conviction for voluntary manslaughter because of failure to
instruct the jury that there is no duty to retreat); Cook v. State, 467 So.2d 203, 210-11 (Miss.
1985) (allowing self-defense even though defendant did not retreat). A substantial minority of
jurisdictions, as well as the Model Penal Code, require retreat in some circumstances before
allowing the use of deadly force. LAFAVE & ScoTT, supra note 4, § 5.7(0, at 461; see, e.g.,
MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04, cmt. (4)(c), at 54-55 (1985); Mischke, supra note 14, at 1015-19
(analyzing the Tennessee Supreme Court's rejection of the "true man rule," which allowed one
to stand his ground).
Exceptions and limitations to the retreat rule exist even in jurisdictions requiring retreat.
Of course, a person is required to retreat only if she can do so in complete safety. LAFAVE &
ScoTT, supra note 4, § 5.7(f, at 461; ROBINSON, supra note 4, § 131(c)(4), at 80 (explaining
that the retreat rule does not require a person to increase the danger to herself); Beale, supra
note 14, at 579 (emphasizing that retreat is not required if it would not diminish the danger).
Even where retreat can be made safely, however, many jurisdictions will not require it where
the victim is in his dwelling or place of business. LAFAVE & ScoTr, supra note 4, § 5.7(f, at
461; see, e.g., JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW § 18.02(3)(b), at 197-98
(1987) ("A non-aggressor need not retreat from or in his home. This exception is based on the
early property law view that a man's home is his castle-a natural sanctuary from external
aggression."); Beale, supra note 14, at 579 ("If one is assailed in his own dwelling-house, which
is his castle, he is not obliged to withdraw therefrom and leave himself in that respect defense-
1993]
390 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71
Several reasons have been advanced for society's reluctance to re-
quire retreat even when one can do so in safety. Some have cited the
notion that requiring retreat would undeservedly reward the person at
fault at the expense of an innocent individual;- 2 others suggest that re-
treat is an ignoble, unmanly, reaction. 3 The law almost never requires
retreat in the home-the "castle" exception-because of society's recog-
nition of the sanctity of the home. 4 Whatever the reasons, though, the
failure to require retreat whenever retreat would prevent the loss of life
weakens the argument that the law should only recognize killings as jus-
tified when they are committed under the "utmost real or apparent ne-
cessity."55 Not requiring retreat even when it could be accomplished in
complete safety permits the use of lethal force even though that force
might not be necessary to prevent death or great bodily harm. In so
doing, the law clearly considers values other than the sanctity of life in
determining whether a defendant can claim self-defense.
III. IS A CHANCE IN SELF-DEFENSE REALLY REQUIRED?
Changing a rule of law designed to enhance the value of human life
merely because law professors can dream up hypotheticals that defy the
rule would be ill-advised. One cannot deny that, in most situations, the
less."); Mitchell, supra note 14, at 89-90 (discussing a Massachusetts statute providing that
there is no duty to retreat from one's dwelling). Some courts have expanded this area beyond
the dwelling to include the immediate vicinity of the dwelling or even the defendant's premises.
Beale, supra note 14, at 579-80. In cases where the use of non-deadly force is at issue, almost
all jurisdictions agree that no retreat is required. LAFAVE & SCoTr, supra note 4, § 5.7(0, at
460; ROBINSON, supra note 4, § 131(c)(4), at 81 (explaining that the aggressor's interest in
being free from non-deadly force does not prevail when balanced against the defendant's inter-
est in standing her ground).
52. See, eg., State. v. Bartlett, 170 Mo. 658, 668, 71 S.W. 148, 151 (1902) ("[T]he wrong-
ful and violent act of one man shall not abolish or even temporarily suspend the lawful and
constitutional right of his neighbor."); see also PERKINS & BOYCE, supra note 13, at 1128
("One suggestion has been that liberty itself is threatened if a law-abiding citizen can be forced
from a place where he has a right to be."); ROBINSON, supra note 4, § 131(c)(4), at 81 (noting
that retreat might force an actor to relinquish a lawful right); Mischke, supra note 14, at 1007
("'[Once] no man could defend himself until ... his back was to the wall; but this is not the
law in free America. Here the wall is to every man's back. It is the wall of his rights; and
when he is [assailed] at a place where he has a right to be, . . . he may stand and defend
himself.' ") (quoting Fowler v. State, 8 Okla. Crim. 130, 135, 126 P. 831, 833 (1912)).
53. LAFAVE & ScoTr, supra note 4, § 5.7(0, at 460; ROBINSON, supra note 4, § 13 l(c)(4),
at 81, 84 (citing both fault and honor rationales). But see, e.g, FLETCHER, supra note 12,
§ 10.5.4., at 865 ("[I]f the choice is between the actor's honor and the aggressor's life, contem-
porary sentiment would obviously favor saving the aggressor's life."); Beale, supra note 14, at
581 ("A really honorable man .... would perhaps always regret the apparent cowardice of a
retreat, but he would regret ten times more.., the thought that he had the blood of a fellow-
being on his hands.").
54. See supra note 51.
55. State v. Norman, 324 N.C. 253, 260, 378 S.E.2d 8, 13 (1989).
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imminence requirement accurately translates the underlying necessity
principle and therefore plays a useful role in self-defense. It helps to en-
sure, in most situations, that the necessity for protective action is real and
that action, especially lethal action, reasonably appears to be unavoida-
ble. To the extent an aberrational case arises in which the application of
the rule works an injustice, the law provides a safety valve to correct the
injustice-executive clemency-the mechanism that actually worked in
the Norman case to effectuate Ms. Norman's release from prison after a
few months.5 6
This part of the Article thus returns to the phenomenon of women
who kill their batterers, for it is in these cases that the argument is most
often raised that it was necessary to kill in order to prevent a reasonably
certain, but non-imminent, threat to life. Even if changes in self-defense
are not limited to these cases, and they certainly should not be, it is pri-
marily because of these cases that the need for change is perceived.
The batterer-killing cases raise a number of issues in the context of
the imminence requirement. First is the question whether the defend-
ants in these cases can possibly be correct in asserting the reasonableness
of their belief that fatal force was necessary even if the threatened harm
was not imminent. In Norman, for example, changing the defense to
exculpate Ms. Norman's conduct would result in justifying the killing of
a sleeping human being.
Second, even if one concludes that the defendant could have reason-
ably believed that the killing was necessary at the time it was committed,
a question exists whether the defendant's responsibility for bringing
about the situation in these cases should prevent the homicide from being
justified. The third issue relates to whether there is evidence that in a
significant number of cases imminence acts more as an inhibitor than as a
translator. Even if a rule appears unjust in a particular case, if that case
is but an aberration, the conclusion that it would be preferable to leave
the law as it is, and to rely on executive clemency to correct the rare
injustice, may seem appropriate.
The fourth issue raised by the cases in which women kill their bat-
terers is whether it is possible to retain the imminence requirement for
those cases in which it accurately translates the necessity principle, while
at the same time eliminating or modifying it when it interferes with that
principle. Finally, one must question whether, by allowing a defendant
to claim that a killing to prevent non-imminent harm is a justified killing,
56. After Ms. Norman served only two months of her six year sentence, North Carolina
Governor James T. Martin commuted her sentence to time already served. Mark Barrett,
Norman Set Free, ASHEVILLE CITIZEN-TIMES, July 8, 1989, at 1.
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an imprudent message will be conveyed that lethal self-help is a socially
approved method of problem solving.
A. Did She Really Need To Kill?
The first reaction of many people to a non-confrontational killing of
a batterer, as in Norman, is that the killing could not have been necessary
because the defendant simply could have seized the opportunity to flee.
Why alter the law of self-defense when the victim of the abuse could have
merely walked out the door? Under this argument, the time lapse be-
tween the abuse and the killing, and the resulting lack of imminent dan-
ger, conclusively demonstrate that the killing was not necessary.
57
The obvious response to this argument is that a jury would certainly
remain free, even without a strict imminence requirement, to decide that
the killing was not really necessary and, therefore, could convict the de-
fendant upon such a finding. Eliminating the imminence requirement in
a specific case does not mandate a specific verdict, it merely permits the
jury to make the decision on necessity without the interference (or assist-
ance) of the imminence requirement. Nor does its elimination make the
question of imminence irrelevant. Imminence remains, as do the other
factors in the case, relevant to the jury's core inquiry: Was the killing
necessary?
One cannot rest on this counterargument alone, however, because
this objection does raise a subsidiary question about the consideration the
law should give to the possibility of flight in a situation where the woman
has an opportunity to flee. As discussed earlier, part of what first struck
me about Norman was the conviction that Ms. Norman did not have a
realistic alternative to her lethal action, that the only way she could re-
ally be safe was to kill her husband.
J.T. Norman's abuse of his wife was prolonged and vicious. Over
the years, whenever he was drunk, he brutally beat her, often inflicting
serious injuries. He used his fists, bottles, ashtrays, and even a baseball
bat. Mr. Norman forced his wife to prostitute herself to support him.
When she was pregnant he kicked her down the stairs, causing the pre-
mature birth of her child. When she ran away, he tracked her, caught
57. See, e.g., LENORE WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN 15-16 (1979) [hereinafter BAT-
TERED WOMAN] (discussing phenomenon of why battered women remain in the home),
Crocker, supra note 11, at 132-33 (citing prosecutorial arguments that the woman was at fault
because she did not leave the abusive relationship); Grant, supra note 11, at 277 (noting that
courts and law enforcement officers sometimes are reluctant to prosecute batterer because of
woman's failure to leave); cf Norman, 324 N.C. at 261-62, 378 S.E.2d at 13-14 (noting that
defendant had ample opportunity to find non-homicidal solution to abuse).
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her, and beat her. He frequently threatened to kill her.5"
In the days immediately preceding the killing, the abuse Ms. Nor-
man suffered became more constant and vicious, and the threats to kill
her became more frequent and, by all accounts, more believable. Ms.
Norman called the police. The officers told her that she would have to
take out a warrant, but she told them that her husband would kill her if
she did. The officers left, but returned when they received a call that she
had taken an overdose of pills. When the ambulance arrived, Mr. Nor-
man tried to interfere, saying, "Let the bitch die ... She ain't nothing but
a dog . . . She don't deserve to live," and threatened to kill her, her
mother, and her grandmother.5 9
The day after she was released from the hospital, Ms. Norman
sought help at a counseling center. When she returned home and told
her husband that he must stop drinking or she would have him commit-
ted, he told her that he would cut her throat if he saw someone coming
for him. During the day, he threatened twice to cut off her breast, and
his threats to kill her continued until he took a nap late that afternoon,
forcing her to lie on the floor by the bed.6"
The point of this grisly recitation is not to demonstrate that Mr.
Norman deserved to be killed because of his past misdeeds, nor to pro-
vide substance for a "battered women's syndrome" defense, which would
focus on the impact this abuse had on Ms. Norman's psyche.61 Rather,
58. State v. Norman, 89 N.C. App. 384, 386, 366 S.E.2d 586, 587, (1988), rev'd, 324 N.C.
253, 378 S.E.2d 8 (1989). Ms. Norman was abused for twenty of the twenty-five years of her
marriage. Id. at 385, 366 S.E.2d at 587. In addition to calling Ms. Norman a "dog," J.T.
Norman treated her like an animal.
Norman would often make defendant bark like a dog, and if she refused, he would
beat her. He often forced defendant to sleep on the concrete floor of their home and
on several occasions forced her to eat dog or cat food out of the dog or cat bowl.
Id. at 386, 366 S.E.2d at 587.
59. Id. at 387, 366 S.E.2d at 588. Only with the intervention of law enforcement was Ms.
Norman able to go to the Rutherford Hospital. On the advice of a counselor at the hospital,
Ms. Norman spent the night at her grandmother's house instead of returning immediately
home. Id.
60. Id. at 388, 366 S.E.2d at 588. Earlier that day, J.T. Norman poured beer on his wife's
head and kicked her in the side of the head as she drove him and a friend to Spartanburg. Id.
at 387, 366 S.E.2d at 588. According to witnesses, the beatings that day were angrier and
more violent than usual and persisted throughout the day. Id. At trial, police officers testified
that when they arrived after the shooting they found burns and bruises on Ms. Norman's body.
Id. at 385, 366 S.E.2d at 587.
61. At trial the defense presented the testimony of two expert witnesses that Ms. Norman
"fit and exceed[ed] the profile[ ] of an abused or battered spouse." Id. at 388, 366 S.E.2d at
589. According to one expert, Ms. Norman
could not leave her husband because she had gotten to the point where she had no
belief whatsoever in herself and believed in the total invulnerability of her husband
.... Mrs. Norman didn't leave because she fully believed that [J.T. Norman] was
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the narrative lends credence to the notion that, given this history, a rea-
sonable person could have believed that the only way to stop Mr. Nor-
man from killing or greatly harming his wife was to kill him.
Other than the use of lethal force, Ms. Norman's options were lim-
ited. One choice was to do nothing-to sleep on the floor as her husband
commanded her and to await whatever lay ahead. Another option was
to arm herself and wait until the next attack before killing her husband.
Yet another was to call for help. Finally, she could have just fled into the
night. Each of these choices carried a realistic chance of great harm or
death to Ms. Norman. Given her husband's past behavior and threats,
doing nothing offered an assurance that she would suffer at least great
bodily harm during one of his drunken attacks.62
Similarly, it does not strain the imagination to calculate the risk Ms.
Norman would have taken had she decided to wait until the next attack
before wielding her weapon. Perhaps she would have been able to extract
the gun from its hiding place in time to protect herself. Perhaps she
would have been able to shoot her husband before he reached her. Per-
haps the first shot would have been effective enough to stop him. Unless
all three of these conditions were met, however, she could easily have
been a dead woman.
invulnerable to the law and to all social agencies that were available; that nobody
could withstand his power. As a result there was no such thing as escape.
Id. at 389, 366 S.E.2d at 589. Of course, because the jury was not allowed to decide whether
Ms. Norman acted in self-defense, this evidence, no matter how powerful, could not, absent
jury nullification, produce an acquittal.
The battered woman syndrome describes the psychological responses of women trapped
in a battering relationship. In 1979, Dr. Lenore Walker first described the syndrome in The
Battered Woman. As defined by Dr. Walker,
[a] battered woman is a woman who is repeatedly subjected to any forceful physical
or psychological behavior by a man in order to coerce her to do something he wants
her to do without any concern for her rights .... [I]n order to be classified as a
battered woman, the couple must go through the battering cycle at least twice.
BATrERED WOMAN, supra note 57, at xv. Two theories form the basis of Dr. Walker's analy-
sis of the syndrome. The first is learned helplessness. When animals or humans are subjected
to randomly administered negative stimuli that they are unable to avoid, they learn that noth-
ing they do will alter the result. Eventually they make no effort to avoid the negative stimuli
even if the means to do so are available. Id. at 45-47. The second theory is the cycle theory of
violence, which posits that there are three phases to the battering cycle. The first phase, the
tension building phase, includes minor battering incidents. Phase two, the acute battering
incident, involves the uncontrollable discharge of the tensions built up during phase one. The
final phase, the kindness and contrite loving behavior, results in the complete victimization of
the woman. This is the calm after the storm. The woman is convinced by the batterer that the
abuse will never happen again. Id. at 55-70.
62. The only other remotely realistic possibility would have been Mr. Norman's death
from alcoholism or other natural (or unnatural) causes before the next attack. There are, of
course, instantaneous religious conversions or other miracles that can affect behavior, but soci-
ety usually does not shape its laws around the chances of these occurring.
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As with her other options, calling for help or flight carried a serious
risk of death or great bodily harm. Newspaper and television news re-
ports are filled with stories of spurned men who often go to extraordinary
lengths to pursue the women who reject them, who often hurt these wo-
men and sometimes kill them. The professional literature recently has
developed evidence to support the contention that a woman who is al-
ready being battered by an abusive man, and who tries to leave or get
help, is placing her life at risk. In fact, the time of most danger for the
woman is when she attempts to leave; women are often killed when, and
because, they attempt to escape.63 Efforts to involve outside agencies,
including the police, similarly escalate the risk to the woman. 4 Threats
may turn into force, and non-deadly force into deadly force. As for Ms.
Norman, her husband had told her explicitly that he would maim her or
kill her if she tried to alter the situation, and can one honestly maintain
that she was unreasonable in believing him?
Ms. Norman was not, of course, a total captive. In Robinson's hos-
63. As one writer recently noted, "tT]he most extreme violence [is] turned against women
at separation." Mahoney, supra note 1, at 71-72. She explains that separation actually tends
to increase the incidence of violence and that more than half the women who leave their hus-
bands are violently harassed. Id. at 72 n.309. One study of men who killed their partners
found that 57% were separated at the time. ANGFLA BROWNE, WHEN BATTERED WOMEN
KILL 144 (1987). Another study also found that over half of the killings by males of their
partners were prompted by separation or the threat of separation. CYNTHIA K. GILLESPIE,
JUSTIFIABLE HOMICIDE 150-52 (1989) (citing study by Dr. George Barnard); see also
CHARLES P. EWING, BATTERED WOMEN WHO KILL 13 (1987) (finding frequent escalation of
violence when women attempt to leave batterers); LENORE WALKER, THE BATTERED WO-
MAN SYNDROME 144 (1984) [hereinafter SYNDROME] (citing link between abuse and killings
of spouses and children); Grant, supra note 11, at 284 ("It is during a separation from the
batterer that a battered woman and her children are most likely to be killed."); Lenore E.
Walker, et al., Beyond the Juror's Ken: Battered Women, 7 VT. L. REV. 1, 12 ("Most of the
batterers had warned the women that they would never let them leave alive, or that the batter-
ers would find and punish them if they did escape. Many of these women [homicide defend-
ants] had tried to leave and were badly beaten for it."); Marilyn H. Mitchell, Note, Does Wife
Abuse Justify Homicide?, 24 WAYNE L. REV. 1705, 1710 (1978) (stating that battered women
may be pursued for years by their batterers); Ann Jones, When Battered Women Fight Back,
BARRISTER, Fall 1982, at 14 (noting that it is common for batterers to pursue and kill es-
tranged wives and girlfriends). For additional discussion of separation assault, see generally
Mahoney, supra note 1, at 71-93.
64. This unsurprising phenomenon was documented in a 1976 study in Chicago of 132
incarcerated women, 40% of whom had killed an abusive mate. Angela Browne & Kirk Wil-
liams, Exploring the Effect of Resource Availability and the Likelihood of Female Perpetrated
Homicides, 23 L. & Soc'Y REv. 75, 77-78 (1989). In this study all of the women who had
killed their batterers reported that they had sought help from outside sources, and most noted
that the violence increased after their attempts to gain outside assistance. Id. at 78; see also
GILLESPIE, supra note 63, at 139 (citing danger abused woman faces in calling for help, espe-
cially if batterer has warned against attempt to get assistance); Crocker, supra note 11, at 134
(explaining that when the police respond to a woman's call for help but do not arrest the
batterer or help the woman leave, the batterer's rage increases after the police have gone).
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tage example, discussed earlier in this Article,65 the captive can only es-
cape by killing the captor. Even if flight would have been risky for Ms.
Norman, there was at least a chance that she could have crept out of
town, masked her identity, and fled to Alaska to establish a new life.
One could argue, therefore, that the killing of her husband was not abso-
lutely necessary. The difficulty with such an argument is that it is based
on an erroneous premise-that the law always requires absolute necessity
before granting the privilege of self-defense. In fact, the law never re-
quires the necessity to be absolute before allowing self-defense. The pos-
sibility always exists that a person attacking another with a gun will
change his mind, or miss, or have a heart attack before pulling the trig-
ger. If a reasonable person in the situation, however, would believe that
deadly force was needed, the law permits the use of fatal defensive force.
Similarly, the mere possibility of retreat is not determinative so long as a
reasonable person would believe that the retreat would not provide
safety.
Take the analysis one step further, however, and assume that Ms.
Norman could have escaped safely from her house and fled to Alaska,
where she could change her identity and live happily, and safely, ever
after. If society required her to do this, the end result most likely would
be one less dead body, a result not always possible when the aggressor is
coming after the victim at the moment she kills in self-defense. The sim-
ple answer to this proposition is that society does not now, nor has it
ever, required completely innocent people to behave in this fashion. No
matter how clear it was to Gary Cooper that somebody would end up
dead if he did not leave before the train carrying his enemy arrived at
"High Noon," our culture allows him to stay in town and affords him the
right to kill in self-defense when the bad guys come after him. 6 Even
when retreat is required, which is not all that often, one must only physi-
65. See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
66. HIGH NOON (United Artists 1952). I realize that I need to explain this reference to
my younger readers. "High Noon" was a 1952 Oscar-winning western starring Gary Cooper
as Will Kane and Grace Kelly as his wife Amy. As the movie opens, Gary and Grace have
just gotten married, he has resigned his marshall's job, and they are getting ready to head out
of Hadleyville. The news arrives that convicted (and pardoned) killer Frank Miller is coming
in on the noon train to carry out his threat to kill Cooper, who put him away. The two
lovebirds leave, but soon Cooper pulls in the reins, saying "They're making me run. I've never
run from anybody before .... We'd have to run again as long as we live." Sure enough, he
returns to town, and, over the protests of the townspeople, puts the badge back on. When high
noon comes, he meets the gunslingers in the fatal showdown, helped only by his ex-pacifist
wife, who shoots one of the bad guys in the back. Naturally, all four of the evildoers are slain,
and as the movie ends, Gary throws his marshall's star into the dust and gets back into the




cally move to a place of temporary safety. Renunciation of personal and
family identity is not demanded.67
There may come a time when society will develop mechanisms, in
the criminal justice system or elsewhere, that would effectively guarantee
women in Ms. Norman's position refuge and safety. When, or if, that
occurs, society could, and should, require that women choose a non-
lethal option by requiring either imminence of the threatened harm or a
retreat/flight alternative. That time, however, certainly has not
arrived.68
67. See supra notes 49-55 and accompanying text. Traditionally, before claiming self-
defense, one had to "flee to the wall." Beale, supra note 14, at 575; see also FLETCHER, supra
note 12, § 5.1, at 353; PERKINS & BOYCE, supra note 13, at 1122-23. As Justice Cardozo has
stated, one who retreats "is under no duty to take to the fields and the highways, a fugitive
from [his] own home." Id. at 1137.
68. The complaints about the inadequacy of our present responses to domestic violence
are legion. See, eg., EWING, supra note 63, at 13-17 (detailing obstacles women encounter in
looking for protection against batterers); Browne & Williams, supra note 64, at 78 (finding that
all of the women studied who had killed abusive mates reported that they had called for police
help at least five times before acting); Schneider, supra note 11, at 626 ("The reluctance of law
enforcement officers to intervene and arrest has led a police commander in Detroit to acknowl-
edge: 'You can readily understand.. . why the women ultimately take the law into their own
hands or despair of finding relief at all.' "); see also State v. Norman, 89 N.C. App. 384, 388,
366 S.E.2d 586, 588 (1988), rev'd, 324 N.C. 253, 378 S.E.2d 8 (1989) (noting the testimony of
Ms. Norman's daughters that the sheriff's department failed to respond to their call for assist-
ance the day Ms. Norman killed her husband). See generally Eber, supra note 11, at 905-17
(discussing problems with alternatives to violent self-help); Matthew Litsky, Note, Explaining
the Legal System's Inadequate Response to the Abuse of Women: A Lack of Coordination, 8
N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTs. 149 (1990) (arguing that the legal system has failed to launch any
substantial response to the issue of battering).
The most recent approach to finding a solution to domestic violence is the "anti-stalking"
law. According to one recent report, at least 28 states are considering anti-stalking laws or
have already enacted them. Rosalind Resnick, States Enact 'Stalking' Laws, NAT'L L. I., May
11, 1992, at 3. In 1989, the shooting death of actress Rebecca Schaeffer, star of the TV sitcom
"My Sister Sam," focused national attention on the problem. After five women were mur-
dered in succession by former husbands or boyfriends, California passed the first anti-stalking
law in 1990. Id. at 27; see also CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.9 (Supp. 1992). Florida recently
passed one of the toughest anti-stalking laws in the country, making "willful, malicious, and
repeated" following of another person a first degree misdemeanor punishable by up to a year in
jail and a $1000 fine. FLA. STAT. ch. 784.048 (1992). Aggravated stalking, which is harass-
ment that includes threats of death or injury, would be a third degree felony with a maximum
prison term of five years and a $5000 fine. Id. For added protection, the Florida statute also
allows the police to arrest a suspected stalker without obtaining a warrant or catching him or
her in the act. Id. The North Carolina General Assembly passed an anti-stalking statute on
June 30, 1992. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-277.3 (1992). Under the newly-enacted law, a person
may be convicted of stalking if he establishes a pattern of willfully following another person
without legal purpose and with the intent of causing emotional distress by placing that person
in reasonable fear of death or bodily injury and continues this after reasonable warning or
request to desist. Id. The initial penalty for conviction of this misdemeanor, however, is only
up to six months imprisonment and/or a fine of up to $1,000.00. Id. The statute does provide
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B. Responsibility and Fault
Although the preceding section assumes that Ms. Norman was an
innocent victim, some might disagree with that assumption. While a kid-
napping victim presumably has no responsibility whatsoever for being
kidnapped, some would argue that a woman who stays with an abusive
man has contributed, at least in some tangential way, to the development
of a life-threatening situation. 9 Under this view, even if flight carries an
unacceptable risk of death at the time of the killing (or even for an appre-
ciable period of time beforehand), there well may be some period of time
when the woman could leave without risk of death or serious injury and
should perceive that remaining in the relationship would be dangerous.
Should not the law require that she leave at this point rather than allow
her to kill at some later time?
One could dispute whether this window of knowledge and opportu-
nity exists. Even assuming that it does, however, and even assuming fur-
ther that there is an identifiable point in time when a "reasonable person"
would recognize that window and act accordingly, there is no reason
why that should deprive someone like Ms. Norman of the right to self-
defense. To decide otherwise would be to confuse responsibility with
fault. Gary Cooper certainly was responsible for the showdown at high
noon. He had already resigned his marshall's job and was on his way out
of town with his new wife. Aside from their threat to him, the despera-
does did not seem to present any present threat to others in the town.
Cooper could have taken everyone's advice and just kept on going, but he
did not, and four men ended up dead. As responsible as Cooper was,
however, he was not at fault. He had a right to stay in town, to reclaim
his marshall's badge for one more day, and no pardoned killer or his
cohorts had the right to make him leave.
Fault involves culpability, blameworthiness. Was Ms. Norman cul-
pable for staying to raise her kids and grandchildren? Should she have
abandoned them to her husband? Did she not, like Marshall Kane, have
people to protect and a job to do? Is she blameworthy for trying to make
a marriage work, for trying to convince her husband to get help, for not
running away? Certainly many women would leave at the first hint of
for an increased penalty of up to five years imprisonment if the defendant is convicted of
stalking more than once in a five-year period. Id.
Only time will tell whether these statutes will do anything at all to prevent life-threatening
situations from arising. It is certainly difficult to imagine that they would deter someone of
Mr. Norman's ilk. Much of what he did to his wife was already against the law, and the threat
of an additional misdemeanor or minor felony prosecution would seem unlikely to have de-
terred him.
69. See supra note 57.
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physical abuse. Perhaps it can be said that one who does not choose this
course has some responsibility for the ever-worsening situation. That
does not, however, render culpable one who remains, whether for love or
for lack of other options. A difficult choice among many difficult
choices, even one that, in hindsight, turns out to be wrong, is not neces-
sarily a culpable choice.
70
Comparison to the retreat doctrine is instructive here. Even in juris-
dictions that generally require retreat, the law recognizes that necessity
sometimes must be tempered by lack of fault and other policy considera-
tions.71 The law does not require people to retreat in their homes, even if
they can do so in complete safety, because they have a right to be there.
This is a right that society does not allow an aggressor to usurp.72 Like-
wise Ms. Norman had a right to live in her house, in her town, and with
her family.
C. Are Things Really This Bad?
Much more is known today than a few decades ago about the bat-
tering of women and about women who kill their batterers. Unfortu-
nately, much of the current knowledge teaches that much of what Ms.
Norman was forced to endure is all too common in this society.
Like Ms. Norman, other women who kill their batterers almost
never kill in response to a single instance of battering; instead, they usu-
ally kill after a long history of physical abuse.73 The batterers commonly
70. The most widely cited obstacle to a woman's leaving her batterer is fear. Batterers
frequently threaten to harm the woman, her children, other family, or her friends if she leaves.
Roberta K. Thyfault, Comment, Battered Women Syndrome on Trial, 20 CAL. W. L. REV.
485, 489 (1984). It is not unusual for the batterer to prevent the battered woman from leaving
the house and to refuse to allow her to work or contact family members or friends. BROWNE,
supra note 63, at 53; EWING, supra note 63, at 27; GILLESPIE, supra note 63, at 80, 128;
Victoria M. Mather, The Skeleton in the Closet: The Battered Woman Syndrome, Self Defense,
and Expert Testimony, 39 MERCER L. REv. 545, 556 (1988); Schneider, supra note 11, at 627.
The batterer enforces this isolation by threatening to kill or maim the woman, members of her
family, or her friends. SYNDROME, supra note 63, at 42-43; see supra note 59 and accompany-
ing text. The result of the batterer's effort is intimidation of the spouse, thus controlling her
mentally as well as physically. Accordingly, in the classic battered woman situation, the bat-
terer, not the battered spouse, is responsible for the psychological dependency that the wife
feels and which forces her to remain with her abuser.
71. See supra notes 51-55 and accompanying text.
72. Id.
73. Mahoney, supra note 1, at 35 nn.141-42 (citing Angela Browne's study on women
who kill their batterers). In Angela Browne's study of women who suffered abuse for years
before killing their abusers, she reports that 40% of the women studied indicated that, by the
time they killed their abusers, incidents of abuse were occurring more than once a week.
BROWNE, supra note 63, at 68. Browne found also that the abuse had become progressively
more severe as the relationship went on, id., and that in 85-90% of the cases, the women had
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use weapons as well as their fists and commonly cause serious injuries.7 4
Alcohol is frequently involved.75 The batterer often combines threats to
kill or maim with other abuse.7 6 Forced sex of one sort or another is
called the police for help at least once in the two-year period prior to the killing. Id. at 10; see
also supra note 68 (discussing futile attempts by women to get protection from their batterers).
By definition, classification as a battered woman implies a history of abuse. According to
Walker,
[b]attered women include wives or women in any form of intimate relationships with
men. Furthermore, in order to be classified as a battered woman, the couple must go
through the battering cycle at least twice. Any woman may find herself in an abusive
relationship with a man once. If it occurs a second time, and she remains in the
situation, she is defined as a battered woman.
BATTERED WOMAN, supra note 57, at xv. Placing more emphasis on the incidents of assaults,
Browne defines battered women as
those who have been struck repeatedly, often experiencing several different kinds of
physically violent actions in one incident, and usually, by the time they are identified,
having experienced a series of such incidents, each consisting of a cluster of violent
acts.
BROWNE, supra note 63, at 13. For a detailed discussion of the types and duration of abuse
suffered by women who kill their batterers, see EWING, supra note 63, at 24-33 (citing studies
done by Lenore Walker, Angela Browne and Ann Jones). But see MILDRED DALEY
PAGELOW, WOMAN-BATrERING: VICTIMS AND THEIR EXPERIENCE 44 (1981) (defining bat-
tered woman through focus on control rather than incidents of violence and arguing that the
woman's reaction to the primary battering incident is key to whether a secondary battering
will occur).
74. BROWNE, supra note 63, at 58 (women in the homicide group reported being beaten
with an object, threatened or injured with a weapon, scalded with hot liquid, or held under
water); EWING, supra note 63, at 24, 27, 31 (weapons used included not only guns and knives
but ordinary household items such as boiling water, mallets, tire irons, belts, dog chains, and
baseball bats). In one study, 60 out of 144 persons who filed a domestic assault claim had been
assaulted with a weapon in the prior assault. Mitchell, supra note 63, at 1708. The presence of
weapons in the home appears to increase the chance that a lethal incident will occur. SYN-
DROME, supra note 63, at 42. Dr. Walker interviewed 50 women who killed their batterers;
thirty-eight of the 50 women killed their batterer with a gun, and 29 of these had previously
been threatened with the same weapon by their abusers. Id. at 40-42. Not surprisingly, the
women subjected to the violence suffered a variety of serious injuries, including "bruises, cuts,
black eyes, concussions, broken bones, and miscarriages caused by beatings, to permanent inju-
ries such as damage to joints, partial loss of hearing or vision, and scars from burns, bites, or
knife wounds." BROWNE, supra note 63, at 69; see also EWING, supra note 63, at 24-40 (sum-
marizing the findings of Dr. Lenore Walker, Dr. Angela Browne, Ann Jones, and others);
GILLESPIE, supra note 63, at 126-27 (noting that women who kill their batterers tend to have
been injured more severely than those women who do not kill their batterers); Mather, supra
note 70, at 555 (stating that bruises are the most common injury reported by abused women,
"but broken bones and other severe injuries are far from rare"); Mitchell, supra note 63, at
1708 (reporting that a 1973 Detroit study of 144 domestic assault complaints revealed that
more than 48% of the victims had suffered an injury requiring medical treatment as the result
ofaprior assault). Deflating the myth that physical attacks perpetrated by family members are
not as severe as those by strangers, the 1980 National Crime Survey revealed that when the
attacker was a stranger, 54% of the victims sustained injuries compared to 75% of the victims
when the attacker was an intimate. BROWNE, supra note 63, at 5.
75. SYNDROME, supra note 63, at 67-71.
76. BROWNE, supra note 63, at 65.66; EWING, supra note 63, at 35 (citing Browne and
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frequent, as are assaults during pregnancy. 7
When a woman kills her batterer, the abuse almost always will have
escalated both in frequency and intensity in the period immediately pre-
ceding the killing.78 Almost all of the women kill only after unsuccess-
fully seeking some other solution--escape, requests for assistance to the
police or other outside agencies, or both.79
All of the facts thus far recited clearly are relevant to a self-defense
claim. Prior abuse, threats, and unsuccessful attempts to escape (retreat)
or to get help all would support a claim of self-defense even under the
existing law as long as the woman killed the batterer while the attack was
ongoing. The problem for Ms. Norman was that only after her husband
was asleep did she go to her mother's house, where she found her hus-
band's gun in her mother's pocketbook (her mother had removed it from
the Norman house earlier in the day because of Mr. Norman's threats).
Instead of waiting for Mr. Norman to wake up and batter and threaten
her again, she returned immediately to her own house with the gun and
shot her sleeping husband three times, with the desired fatal result.
There is currently a debate about how frequently women kill their
batterers in such "non-confrontational" situations, i.e., in situations
where the woman is not responding to a present attack by the batterer.
Until recently, the conventional wisdom was that women who killed
Walker studies); GILLESPIE, supra note 63, at 134-35 (arguing that threats to kill by husbands
have to be taken seriously).
77. BROWNE, supra note 63, at 6-7; see also GILLESPIE, supra note 63, at 52 ("Walker and
others have frequently noted the propensity of battering husbands to punch and kick their
pregnant wives in the stomach, with resulting miscarriages and injuries to reproductive or-
gans."); DEL MARTIN, BATTERED WIVES 60 (rev. ed. 1981) (reporting that many abusive
husbands refuse to allow their wives to use contraceptives but then beat them while they are
pregnant); SYNDROME, supra note 63, at 51 (The 403 battered women interviewed reported a
high degree of battering while they were pregnant.).
78. It is this escalation that often convinces the woman finally to respond with lethal force
even though the battering previously had gone on for an extended period. See BROWNE, supra
note 63, at 129; EWING, supra note 63, at 29; Schneider, supra note 11, at 634.
79. BROWNE, supra note 63, at 10 (reporting a study of spousal homicides in Detroit and
Kansas City revealing that in 85-90% of these homicides there had been at least one call to the
police for help in the two-year period prior to the killing; in 54% of the cases there had been at
least five calls to the police prior to the killing); GILLESPIE, supra note 63, at 138 (citing
Kansas City study); Browne & Williams, supra note 64, at 78 (citing a 1976 study in Chicago
of 132 incarcerated women revealing that every one of the 40 women who had killed an abu-
sive partner had called the police for help at least five times prior to the killing); Jones, supra
note 63, at 48 ("[Iln most spouse killings-whether the husband or the wife is the homicide
victim-police have been called on the many previous occasions but have made no arrests.");
Elizabeth H. Schneider & Susan B. Jordan, Representation of Women Who Defend Themselves
in Response to Physical or Sexual Assault, 4 WOMEN'S Rrs. L. REP. 149, 152 n.39 (1978),
reprinted in WOMEN'S SELF DEFENSE CASES 11 (1981) (citing the Detroit and Kansas City
study results).
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their batterers most often killed, as did Ms. Norman, during a lapse in
the confrontation. 0 In a recent article, however, Professor Maguigan,
relying on a survey of reported appellate decisions, argues that most wo-
men kill in response to a present, i.e., imminent attack."
Entering this debate is not the purpose of this Article, for, even ac-
cepting Professor Maguigan's figures, it is apparent that many women,
like Ms. Norman, kill their batterers at a time when the threatened harm
is not imminent, instead of waiting for the next inevitable attack.8 2 This
80. See, e.g., EWING, supra note 63, at 48 (stating that most homicides committed by
battered women take place outside any direct confrontation between the batterer and the wo-
man); GILLESPIE, supra note 63, at 60, 69 (noting that the battered woman and the batterer
seldom are equally matched physically and that it is not surprising that many women who kill
their batterers do so when the man is sleeping or has his back turned); Rosen, supra note 11, at
14 nn. 15-16 (citing cases in which the defendant killed while the batterer was sleeping, resting,
or not actually battering the woman); Schneider, supra note 11, at 634 (noting that killings by
battered women frequently occur with a time lag); see also Holly Maguigan, Battered Women
and Self-Defense: Myths and Misconceptions in Current Reform Proposals, 140 U. PA. L. REV.
379, 382-89 (1991) (noting prevalence of view, but disagreeing with it).
81. Professor Maguigan divides the homicide/self-defense cases into "confrontational"
and "nonconfrontational." Maguigan, supra note 80, at 390-91. Maguigan used "confronta-
tion" to describe a "fact pattern that would entitle a defendant to a self-defense instruction
under the law of most jurisdictions." Id. at 392. Thus, under her scheme, a confrontational
battered woman case exists
if the defendant killed her spouse or lover and at trial evidence was offered on the
record and discussed on appeal that (1) he had abused her in the past, (2) on the
occasion of the homicide he behaved in a way that, according to her testimony, she
interpreted as posing an imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury to her,
(3) she did not provoke his behavior by unlawful actions and was not the initial
aggressor, (4) she violated no duty to retreat and (5) the force she used was propor-
tional to the threat she perceived.
Id. at 392-93. A nonconfrontational case exists if the killing occurred "while either (1) the
man was asleep, (2) the man was awake, but the woman was the initial aggressor on the
particular occasion, or (3) the woman hired or persuaded someone else to kill the man." Id. at
393.
82. Maguigan found 223 battered women's homicide cases reported. Of the 223 base
cases, she classified 75% as confrontational and 20% as nonconfrontational cases. She was
unable to categorize the remaining 5% because the appellate opinions did not include a suffi-
cient discussion of the facts. Id. at 397.
There is no reason to doubt Professor Maguigan's figures. It is important, however, to
understand the limitations of the numbers she reports. First, her figures do not, and do not
claim to, describe the entire universe of criminal cases in which women have been convicted
for killing their batterers, since her universe, by definition, excludes those cases resolved by
plea bargains, as well as those in which verdicts are not appealed. Because over 90% of crimi-
nal cases are plea bargained, see, e.g., WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JERALD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE § 21.1(c) (2d ed. 1992); FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & RICHARD S. FRASE, THE
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 494-96 (1980), we can assume that her universe of reported appel-
late cases represents only a fraction of cases with similar factual bases. More importantly, her
reliance solely on reported appellate cases almost certainly skews the ratio of confrontational
to nonconfrontational cases in favor of the former. The substantive law, after all, does have an
effect on what lawyers and defendants do at the trial level. Consider under Maguigan's defini-
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is the important point in this analysis: Norman is not the sort of isolated,
aberrational incident-like shipwrecked sailors forced to eat their com-
rades to save their own lives 83-that can be relegated safely to executive
clemency. Instead, dozens, perhaps hundreds of women enter the crimi-
nal justice system having killed their batterers in non-confrontational sit-
uations.84 Because these women chose not to wait until they were
attacked again to defend themselves, the law denies them the opportunity
to argue that they acted to protect themselves. This is so even if a jury
could conclude that it was in fact necessary for them to use lethal force.
Moreover, Maguigan's conclusion that we should ignore the injus-
tices in nonconfrontational cases because of the higher number of re-
ported confrontational cases is problematic.85 Maguigan assumes that
guilty verdicts in both categories of cases reflect equal measures of injus-
tice. This cannot be so. It is one thing to have a defense rejected by a
factfinder. It is another not to allow the defense even to be presented for
the factfinder's consideration. In Maguigan's confrontational cases the
jurors considered but rejected self-defense. Perhaps the jurors in these
cases did not believe the evidence of battering. Perhaps they were
presented evidence of a separate reason for the killing. They could, of
course, have rejected the defense based on their prejudice against women
who respond to battering with lethal force, but Maguigan presents no
evidence to support such a conclusion. In the nonconfrontational cases,
tions two cases of women who kill their batterers-one confrontational and one nonconfronta-
tional. Both women are charged with homicide, and, as is quite common, the prosecutors offer
both women plea bargains to lesser offenses. As a defense attorney, I would be far more likely
to advise the woman who killed in a nonconfrontational situation to accept the offer, since I
know that, as the law now stands, I would not be able to argue for, or get an instruction on,
self-defense at trial. Thus, the case in which the woman who kills during a confrontation is
more likely to go to trial, and thus is more likely to be appealed and to be represented in
Maguigan's figures.
83. See, e.g., The Queen v. Dudley and Stephens, 14 Q.B.D. 273 (1884). This famous
cannibalism case may not be as aberrational as was once thought; there were apparently a
number of cases in which shipwrecked sailors feasted on their brethren, although some of the
unfastidious diners were never brought to trial because they, unlike Dudley and Stephens,
gained their place at the table by way of a lottery with those who ended up as dinner. A. W.
BRIAN SIMPSON, CANNIBALISM AND THE COMMON LAW: THE STORY OF THE TRAGIC LAST
VOYAGE OF THE MIGNONETTE AND THE STRANGE LEGAL PROCEEDINGS TO WHICH IT
GAVE RISE 122-45 (1984).
84. Although Maguigan's study includes reported cases from as far back as 1857, the vast
majority are recent. By my count, she found only 14 reported cases between 1857 and 1978 in
which women killed their batterers, but 117 between 1979 and 1991, with 34 of these being in
1990 and 1991. Maguigan, supra note 80, at 461-78 (tabulating dates from cases in Table).
And, as discussed supra note 81, these cases assuredly represent only a fraction of the criminal
cases involving women killing their batterers, and, because of the present substantive criminal
law, most likely underrepresent the ratio of nonconfrontational cases.
85. Maguigan, supra note 80, at 403-04 (deriding previous authors for focus on noncon-
fronational cases).
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by contrast, the jurors never had the opportunity to consider whether the
killing was reasonably necessary to save the defendant's life. That, assur-
edly, is an injustice.
D. Imminence, Necessity, and the Jury
Using a necessity rule instead of an imminence rule imports no new
norms into the law of self-defense; it merely changes the locus of decision
making. Under the current criminal justice scheme, the legislature, or, in
common-law jurisdictions, judges, already have decided that a killing to
prevent a non-imminent threatened harm can never be a necessary kill-
ing. 6 In light of this predetermined conclusion jurors must then decide
the case. Removing or modifying the imminence rule shifts the locus of
decisionmaking to jurors, allowing them to weigh the evidence and make
their own decision on necessity in a suitable case.8 7
Such a shift is not without risks. One reasonable concern is that a
jury would be encouraged to make ad hoc decisions based upon its esti-
mation of the relative worth of the individuals involved. The danger also
exists that increasing the discretion given to jurors will simultaneously
increase the opportunity for bias, arbitrariness, or discrimination to influ-
ence the jurors' decision making. After all, it arguably was the Crown's
distrust of jurors' proclivities in homicide cases that led to the medieval
development of strict rules for self-defense.88
Although there is no way to eliminate these risks, they do not ap-
pear to be overly troubling in cases of nonconfrontational killings of bat-
terers. Aside from eliminating the imminence requirement, the law of
self-defense would remain as it now stands. Jurors would still be in-
structed that the use of deadly defensive force is justified only in those
situations in which such force reasonably appears to be necessary. Jurors
would still be instructed on the proportionality principle: that deadly
force can be used only in the face of a threat of serious bodily injury or
death. Jurors would still be instructed on the fault principle: that the
defendant must not be culpable in the creation of the life-threatening sit-
uation and that the defendant may use deadly force only if her belief in
the necessity for its use is objectively reasonable. Jurors would still be
instructed that the defendant must have acted out of fear, not revenge or
spite, and that deadly force may be used only if the defendant reasonably
86. See supra note 4.
87. By "suitable" I mean a case in which the defendant can carry a burden of producing
evidence that fatal force was necessary to protect the defendant from the threatened, albeit
non-imminent, harm. See infra notes 91-92 and accompanying text.
88. See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text.
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believed, and the evidence supported the reasonableness of the belief, that
the force was necessary to prevent the harm threatened.
In the final analysis, how one views these risks depends on the de-
gree of trust one has in jurors to follow their instructions and objectively
determine the cases before them. Today's jurors are not the same as the
friends and neighbors who judged medieval defendants and displayed an
understandable reluctance to see those in their community sacrifice life
and/or property to a distant sovereign. Today's jurors are, hopefully in
fact as well as in principle, objective and disinterested fact finders.
Increasing jury discretion in these cases, it should be noted, differs
from a similar relaxation of rules in other areas. In a situation involving,
for example, capital punishment, the danger that jurors may act discrimi-
natorily or capriciously is sufficiently strong to militate against giving
jurors total discretion to impose the death penalty.8 9 By contrast, the
situation of women who kill their batterers, or of other defendants who
might raise self-defense in a nonconfrontational case, will not likely re-
sult in jurors' undue reliance on impermissible factors. Unlike the death
penalty, nonconfrontational killings of this type do not carry the histori-
cal baggage of race and class discrimination. 90
Moreover, a readily available mechanism exists that could limit the
possibility of an improper exercise of jury discretion. One need not re-
place imminence with necessity in every case in which self-defense is
claimed, nor, for that matter, in every case in which a woman kills a
batterer. Because imminence effectively translates the necessity principle
in a significant number of cases, it is both useful and appropriate to con-
tinue to utilize it in those cases.
To accomplish this goal, the trial judge could instruct the jury that a
killing in self-defense must be in response to an imminent danger unless
the defendant is able to meet an initial burden of production by present-
ing substantial evidence that the killing was necessary even though the
danger was not imminent. If, and only if, the defendant meets this bur-
den of production would imminence be eliminated as a sine qua non for
self-defense. Only then would the jury be instructed solely on necessity,
with the imminence of the threat constituting only one factor among
89. The long history of discrimination and arbitrariness in the imposition of the death
penalty in this country is discussed extensively in the five opinions of the concurring majority
justices in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). For a further discussion, see CHARLES L.
BLACK, JR., CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: THE INEVITABILITY OF CAPRICE AND MISTAKE passim
(2d ed. 1981).
90. For evidence of the continuation of arbitrariness and discrimination in capital punish-
ment in the United States, see McCleskey v. Zant, 111 S. Ct. 1454 (1991), where a majority of
the Supreme Court responded to irrefutable evidence with a collective shrug of their shoulders.
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many to be considered. This procedure would retain the imminence re-
quirement in those cases in which it is a translator of the necessity princi-
ple, but would remove it when it acts as a potential inhibitor.9'
This approach would serve several functions. On the theoretical
side, the use of the unmodified necessity principle where appropriate
would allow for a degree of individual justice without diluting the overall
integrity of society's notions of self-defense. On the practical side, most
self-defense cases will remain unchanged. In nonconfrontational situa-
tions outside of the battered woman scenario, society usually provides
other reasonably feasible alternatives to homicidal self-help. Thus, even
though the changes in self-defense law this Article advocates are not lim-
ited theoretically to cases in which women kill their batterers, few de-
fendants in generic self-defense cases could meet even a minimal burden
of production on a claim that self-defense was warranted even though the
danger threatened was not imminent.92
91. This manner of allocating burdens of persuasion and proof is used in a number of
different contexts in the criminal law. For example, in North Carolina, although the state
must always carry the burden of persuasion on the issues of premeditation and deliberation in
a first degree murder case, a defendant is entitled to an instruction on intoxication when he can
produce "substantial evidence which would support a conclusion by the judge that he was so
intoxicated that he could not form a deliberate and premeditated intent to kill." State v. Mash,
323 N.C. 339, 346, 372 S.E.2d 532, 536 (1988). The question of whether the defendant has
produced such "substantial evidence" is a question of law to be determined first by the trial
judge, and then by the appellate court, considering the evidence in the light most favorable to
the defendant. Id. at 348, 372 S.E.2d at 537. Similarly, under the Model Penal Code, even
though the prosecution always bears the burden of proving an essential element of the offense,
the defendant sometimes is required to meet a burden of production to raise an affirmative
defense to one of the elements. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.12(2) (1985). In other words, as
to some defenses the burden of persuasion remains with the prosecution even though a burden
of producing at least some evidence supporting the defense is placed on the defendant. The
Code suggests that this placement of the burdens is appropriate when the defense "involves a
matter of excuse or justification peculiarly within the knowledge of the defendant on which he
can fairly be required to adduce supporting evidence." Id. § 1.12(3)(c).
In North Carolina a similar procedure also is used with regard to the presumption of
malice, long used in murder prosecutions, that arises from the intentional use of a deadly
weapon in a killing. When the killing has been caused by the intentional use of a deadly
weapon, the prosecution is entitled to rely on this presumption unless the defendant produces
some evidence that the killing was not committed with malice aforethought, i.e., that the de-
fendant acted in the heat of passion. Once this evidence is produced, the presumption is re-
moved from the case and the jury is instructed to consider the issue of malice based on all of
the evidence, including the use of a deadly weapon. See Davis v. Allsbrooks, 778 F.2d 168,
177-83 (4th Cir. 1985) (Phillips, J., specially concurring) (describing operation of North Caro-
lina law).
92. It is possible, however, to envision other cases which might fit this category. For
instance, there may be cases in which a prison inmate, having committed a nonconfrontational
killing of another inmate, might be able to produce evidence that his attempts to find another
way to protect himself were not successful. Of course, in this day and age it is certainly not
beyond the realm of feasibility to imagine Robinson's kidnap scenario played out in real life.
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Even the impact on trials in which the defendant successfully meets
the initial burden of production should not be overwhelming. Most
courts, as the trial court did in Norman, already admit evidence about
prior abuse and threats, as well as testimony about battered women's
syndrome. Replacing imminence with necessity in an appropriate case
should not alter this. Rather, it would permit the jury to consider this
evidence not only in the context of why the woman did not leave, but
also in determining whether the abuse and threats produced a reasonable
fear of death.
One further change, however, is needed. In appropriate cases, the
jury should be allowed to consider evidence of the availability and effi-
cacy of alternatives to the use of lethal force to kill a batterer in a non-
confrontational setting as well as the woman's knowledge of these alter-
natives. Because, in a case involving a nonconfrontational killing, in
which a woman has the time to avoid the harm, evidence about whether
she had a realistic chance to avoid death or serious physical abuse with-
out killing (or without obliterating her identity) and whether society had
provided her with information about these alternatives, is indisputably
relevant. The jury cannot make an informed decision on this issue with-
out being informed of the defendant's alternatives. Assuming that the
fate awaiting Ms. Norman (and others similarly situated) was reasonably
certain death or grave bodily harm had she not acted as she did, the jury
should know that society presently provides her with no reasonable alter-
natives that would even minimally protect her for more than a brief
time.93
E. What Message Are We Sending?
Much has been written of the status of self-defense as a justification
defense94 and the limitations that this status supposedly imposes on the
See supra notes 23-24. Nonetheless, it is a rare defendant outside of these contexts who cannot
gain a reasonable measure of protection by a call to the police once a threat has been made.
93. See supra note 68 and accompanying text. Further, requiring those who are responsi-
ble for providing alternatives to homicidal self-help to explain their efforts before a jury will act
as an incentive for society to provide non-homicidal escape from this dilemma.
94. An act that otherwise meets the elements of a crime may be justified by the circum-
stances surrounding the act or by a balancing of the interests at stake. Jerome E. Bickenbach,
The Defence of Necessity, 13 CAN. J. PHIL. 79, 87-88 (1983) (noting that the circumstances of a
voluntary choice justify a wrongful action); B. Sharon Byrd, Wrongdoing and Attribution: Im-
plications Beyond the Justification-Excuse Distinction, 33 WAYNE L. REv. 1289, 1290 (1987);
Benjamin B. Sendor, Mistakes of Fact: A Study in the Structure of Criminal Conduct, 25
WAKE FOREST L. REv. 707, 723 (1990) ("The injury to the right does not constitute a viola-
tion of the right, because the defendant's conduct was necessary to protect a competing right of
superior or equal value."). Because of these considerations, the wrongfulness of the act is
negated. See id.
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ability to change the defense. Some commentators argue that when a
defense is a justification, not only does society not punish the actor when
the terms of the defense are met, it actually gives a societal stamp of
approval to the action. Under this reasoning, by not branding Ms. Nor-
man and others like her as murderers, society actually is encouraging the
use of lethal self-help by all women in that situation, and this is not ap-
propriate unless the death of the batterer is viewed as a social gain.95
This theoretical dilemma has led one author to advocate solving the
problems of the availability of self-defense for women who kill their bat-
terers by changing self-defense from a justification defense to an excuse
defense.
96
Some argue, however, that this is much ado about very little,97 and,
at least in the context of self-defense, they appear to have the better of the
argument. Neither jurors nor putative defendants are aware of the subtle
distinctions between a justification and excuse, and from my experiences
it is clear that few judges could explain the difference. There is not even
any agreement among commentators whether self-defense as it is pres-
ently configured is an excuse or a justification, or a combination of
both,98 so it is difficult to perceive that changing it nominally from one
95. See Paul H. Robinson, A Theory of Justification: Societal Harm as a Prerequisite for
Criminal Liability, 23 UCLA L. REv. 266, 274 (1975) ("Justified behavior is correct behavior
and therefore is not only tolerated but encouraged."); Rosen, supra note 11, at 31, 42-43 (argu-
ing that justification theory requires social approval of an act before it can be justified).
96. Rosen, supra note 11, at 43-45, 56. Rosen believes that classifying self-defense as an
excuse will allow society to avoid unfairly punishing an actor who responded to a lack of
alternatives, while discouraging self-help and valuing human life. Id. at 45-46, 55.
97. Perhaps the strongest proponent of this view is Professor Greenawalt. See Kent
Greenawalt, The Perplexing Borders of Justification and Excuse, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 1897
(1984). He argues that several factors limit the importance of the justification and excuse
categories in real life and that the distinction is largely academic. Id. at 1898-99. Greenawalt
notes that there are no simple and clear criteria for discriminating between justification and
excuse, id. at 1903-04, and demonstrates that the general verdict given by juries makes this
distinction pointless as a practical matter. Id. at 1900-01. Greenawalt states: "A fully com-
prehensive system could divide up all instances of justification and excuse, but it could do so
only by distorting ordinary concepts or by employing some complicated subcategories reflect-
ing significant policy judgments." Id. at 1927; see also Michael Corrado, Notes on the Struc-
ture of a Theory of Excuses, 82 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 465, 467 (1991) (advocating
abandoning the distinction).
98. There is even confusion about what makes something an excuse instead of a justifica-
tion. Some authors have defined "excuse" with a focus on the culpability of the actor rather
than the wrongfulness of the act. See Byrd, supra note 94, at 1290 (explaining that an excuse
"focuses on the blame we may fairly attribute to the actor"). S~ndor finds that an excuse
defense is appropriate when a response meets the elements of a crime, but no disrespect for
rights is involved because the actor "lacks either the capacity or [a] fair opportunity to con-
form to deterrent factors to avoid violating a right." Sendor, supra note 94, at 743. Rosen
defines excused conduct as criminal acts that confer no societal benefit, but for which the actor
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to the other would, as a practical matter, make any difference.
99
Moreover, calling an action justified does not necessarily compel the
conclusion that society encourages the action, including lethal action, as
a course of conduct. While the criminal law does send out moral and,
possibly, utilitarian messages, it is concerned primarily with determining
fault after the fact. Thus, one can reasonably say that an action is justi-
fied if it is an action that the law does not choose to punish."° In order
to be justified, the choice the actor makes need not be the best of all
possible choices, or even the one choice that society prefers. It merely
must be one that society believes should not be punished under the cir-
cumstances of the case.' 0 '
is not "morally blameworthy" due to internal or external pressure. Rosen, supra note 11, at
22.
Rosen further notes that most American jurisdictions classify self-defense as a justifica-
tion, when in fact the principles of excuse and justification have merged. Id. at 45. Robinson
supports this view as well. See Paul H. Robinson, Criminal Law Defenses: A Systematic Anal-
ysis, 82 COLUM. L. Rnv. 199, 236 (1982) ("In most modern codifications, self-defense is appro-
priately treated... as a pure justification. It ... properly accounts for the aggressive conduct
of the attacker when weighing the propriety of taking the attacker's life for the protection of
the defendant."). Still others argue that self-defense, as with any necessity defense, is really
two defenses: excuse and justification. See Glanville Williams, The Theory of Excuses, CRIM.
L. REV. 732, 740 (1982) ("The justification is where the required facts are present; the excuse
is where they are mistakenly believed to be present."). Greenawalt also notes that both theo-
ries of justification and of excuse are utilized in self-defense. Greenawalt, supra note 97, at
1897. Sendor presents a view of the justification/excuse distinction that renders the issue
moot. His dual-wrongfulness theory of criminal wrongdoing has two components:
(a) violation of a right and (b) expression of disrespect for a violated right. Sendor, supra note
94, at 768. According to Sendor, a justification defense negates the wrongfulness of an act,
while an excuse defense negates an actor's responsibility for the act. Id. He argues, however,
that an actor's lack of capacity or responsibility for actions negates the wrongfulness of those
actions as well. Id. at 768, 782. Thus, in both justification and excuse, the actor's behavior
was not wrongful. Id. at 768.
99. Almost everybody, including the foremost proponents of the excuse/justification di-
chotomy, agree that in practical terms the distinction means little today. Robinson, supra note
95, at 276 ("The early common law distinction between justification and excuse exists today
only in theory."); see George P. Fletcher, The Right and the Reasonable, 98 HARv. L. Rv.
949, 954 (1985). Fletcher also notes in Rights and Excuses, 3 CRIM. JUST. ETHicS, 17, 18
(1984), that "these traditional categories receive little notice in a criminal law bent primarily
on deterring harmful behavior and encouraging socially useful acts." See also Greenawalt,
supra note 97, at 1897 (stating that there remains a distinction of excuse/justification in Anglo-
American law but acknowledging that there is no systematic difference recognized).
100. See Joshua Dressler, Reflections on Excusing Wrongdoers: Moral Theory, New Ex-
cuses and the Model Penal Code, 19 RUTGERS L.J. 671, 675 (1988) ("[J]ustified conduct is
right, desirable, warranted, permissible, or, at least, tolerable conduct."); Williams, supra note
98, at 735 (defining a justified act as one that, because of surrounding circumstances, is "so-
cially approved or [a] matter[ ] about which society is neutral").
101. George P. Fletcher, The Right Deed for the Wrong Reason: A Reply to Mr. Robinson,
23 UCLA L. REv. 293, 306 (1975) ("Self-defense appears to be better conceived as a necessary
evil rather than as the bringing about of a state of affairs that is affirmatively desirable.");
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If one views self-defense as a justification defense, this conception of
justification certainly makes sense. Outside the realm of law enforcement
or war, a dead body is never desirable. Society always prefers that no
person be killed. Under certain circumstances of necessity, fault, and
proportionality, however, society is willing to justify the act that pro-
duces the dead body. Although the law attempts to restrict this to situa-
tions in which the alternative definitely would lead to the death of an
innocent, it is willing to retreat from the requirement of absolute neces-
sity when the defender acts without culpability. Indeed, in most cases,
one really cannot know whether defensive force was absolutely necessary
at the time it was used. All one can do, after the fact, is try to determine
whether the defendant's actions reasonably appeared necessary.
Ultimately, a judgment on the appropriateness of self-defense is a
determination of who must bear the risks attendant upon a violent situa-
tion. The message of this Article is that it is the person who creates the
violent situation, and who escalates it to a life-threatening level, who
should bear that risk.
IV. CONCLUSION
What this Article has attempted to do is to focus on the role of the
imminence requirement and examine the possibility of lessening the law's
reliance on it in order to further the values embodied in the doctrine of
self-defense. If the premises of this Article are correct-that the immi-
nence requirement works against these values in enough cases to warrant
change, and that in appropriate cases the imminence requirement can be
eliminated without undermining the basic fabric of the self-defense
laws-then the time has come for legislatures and courts to begin to
make these modifications.
The continuing reports of jury nullifications in cases of women who
kill those who batter them,1 "2 as well as the recent spate of executive
clemencies in such cases,10 3 may signal that the present law of self-de-
Robinson, supra note 95, at 284 ("In self-defense, society does not encourage the resulting
death, . . . but merely tolerates it; no benefit occurs .... ").
102. A number of authors have noted the relatively frequent accounts of jury nullifications
in these cases. See Sunny GrafF, Battered Women, Dead Husbands: A Comparative Study of
Justification and Excuse in American and West German Law, 10 Lov. L.A. INT'L & COMP.
L.i. 1, 23 (1988); Maria L. Marcus, Conjugal Violence: The Law of Force and the Force of
Law, 69 CAL. L. REv. 1657, 1725 & n.314 (citing empirical data supporting claim that nullifi-
cations are relatively common in nonconfrontational batterer-killing cases).
103. In February of 1991 the governor of Maryland commuted the prison terms of eight
women who had been convicted of killing or assaulting their batterers. NEws & OBSERVER
(Raleigh, N.C.), Feb. 21, 1991, at 6A. In December of 1990 the governor of Ohio released 25
women who had been similarly imprisoned. Sue Osthoff, Clemency for Battered Women,
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fense has been outstripped by society's changing morality. It is no longer
considered moral or legal for a man to beat his wife or girlfriend or to
forcibly rape her. Perhaps society no longer considers it a moral impera-
tive that a woman delay taking defensive action until a man who has
already threatened to kill her begins to demonstrate again that he meant
what he said.
The development and acceptance of the "battered women's syn-
drome" defense assuredly is one response to this evolution in society's
values."° This defense, however, seeks to solve the problem of women
who kill their batterers by focusing on the psychological inadequacies of
those who kill,105 and does nothing to help those who kill in non-con-
frontational situations. This Article suggests that if Judy Norman rea-
sonably believed that she needed to kill her torturer in order to protect
herself, it was not because she had acquired a psychological disability-
although psychological scars would be an understandable product of the
abuse she endured-but because her husband had created the conditions
that made such a belief at least reasonable, if not absolutely correct.
Perhaps Judy Norman best answered all the arguments about neces-
sity when she spoke to a newspaper reporter after being informed that
the North Carolina Supreme Court had reinstated her conviction and
that she would have to return to prison as a convicted felon.
I was always scared of him. I was scared to leave. I was scared
to call the law. I was scared he'd kill me, and I was scared
when he got up that night, it would start all over again, and I
never knew when that man would hit me enough to kill me...
I have no worries... I can lie down and sleep well .... 'io
Unless her fear was unreasonable, or unless society had provided
some viable alternatives which would have protected her, her decision to
act on that fear was certainly reasonable, certainly moral. And her ensu-
ing act should not be criminal.
DOUBLE-TIME (Nat'l Clearinghouse for the Def. of Battered Women, Phila., Pa.), Oct. 1990,
at 1. In the spring of 1991 the governor of Texas signed legislation ordering a review of old
murder cases that might have involved women killing their batterers. Sue Osthoff, Clemency
Update, DOUBLE-TIME (Nat'l Clearinghouse for the Def. of Battered Women, Phila., Pa.) Oct.
1990, at 5.
104. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
105. See, e.g., Christine A. Littleton, Women's Experience and the Problem of Transition:
Perspectives on Male Battering of Women, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 23, 38-42 (describing and
disputing vision of "helplessness" of women who kill their batterers).
106. Jane Ruffin, Slaying by Abused Wife Raises Self-Defense Issue, NEws & OBSERVER
(Raleigh, N.C.), Apr. 10, 1989, at 4A.
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